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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to investigate the
relationship between the facilitation with language and
imagery as a function of deafness and age. It is argued
that imagery and language are two independent, although
interacting aspects of thought (Bovier 1970, Paivio I969,
Furth I966, Piaget I962)
, and that imagery is a potent
factor in learning and memory (Bower 1970, Paivio I969).
Subject populations may differ in absolute terms, i.e. one
population may be more or less proficient with language or
imagery or both when compared with another population.
And populations may differ in their relative facilitation
with one code as compared, to another code. It is hypothe-
sized that the variables of deafness and age do affect the
absolute as well as the relative proficiencies with imagery
and language.
The Independence of Thought and Language
The problem of the relationship between thought
and language must be at least as old as the printed word.
Aristotle found language necessary for knowledge (Mesthene
196^) , and we are familiar with the often quoted and equally
often contested proclamation: "In the beginning was the V/ord
. .
.
" (John, p. 92). Among the more recent theorists who
subscribe to such a view of the all- important role of
language are John Watson, who reduces thought to implicit
verbal responses (Watson 1913, 1930), and Benjamin Whorf,
with his thesis that a person's language determines his
world view (Whorf I956).
Nature has provided us with a target population,
the deaf, which promises some clarification of the problem;
in Eans Furth* s words • "...the study of deaf persons may
contribute in a unique way to our general knowledge of
thinking and its relation to language" (Furth 1966, p. 69).
Consequently, a host of investigators has studied the deaf,
in order to answer the questions is there such a thing as
thinking without language? After an extensive review of
the literature and after an equally ambitious research
program, Furth answers the question in the following way:
We know that it [thinking without
language is possible with a degree
of certitude that we would not dare
assert if empirical observation of
o «
deaf persons had not provided a
natural experimentum crucis. (p.l69)c
Furth (I966) found no differences between the deaf and the
hearing on most experimentally used intellective tasks. Tl
deaf were as competent as the hearing in the comprehension
and use of abstract principles and symbols. On some tasks
such as Piaget type tasks and logical symbol discovery,
younger deaf groups seemed somewhat retarded. Such tasks
share the aspect of discovery, and Furth argued that the
poorer social environment and training of the deaf do not
foster curiosity. Inferior performance on these tasks was
explained by the general experiential handicap of the deaf
rather than being due to their linguistic incompetency.
Furth (I966) supported this hypothesis with the finding,
that a rural control group, which was presumably culturally
deprived without, however, evidencing language deficiency,
performed as poorly as the deaf on a discovery task, but
performed as well as the deaf on tasks of symbol use and
symbol comprehension. Thus, Furth argued that, in spite of
their retardation in language, the deaf are not inferior
intellectually to the hearing, and that those inferiorities
which the deaf do demonstrate in certain areas, are not due
to their language deficiency, but are attributable to
experiential and environmental factors. He concludes:
The evidence for conceptual
thinking in the linguistically
deficient deaf ... leads to the
direct conclusion that thinking-
develops through living contact
with the environment regardless
of the presence or absence of a
ready-made linguistic symbol
system, (pp. 198-199 )
•
Rosenstein (1959) claimed that deaf children are
equal to hearing children on non-verbal tasks as well as on
verbal task-, provided that the verbal understanding required
by the experimental task is within the capacity of the deaf
child. This claim regarding the performance on verbal tasks
is not substantiated in various other investigations (Oleron
1950, 1957 » Templin 1950). These studies nevertheless support
my thesis that thinking can and does occur independently of
language. Kates, Kates and Michael (I962) documented in a
series of studies that deaf adolescents do not differ from
hearing subjects on adequacy of categorization, range of
acceptance for membership in a category, generizability of
categories and extent of uninstructed change of categoriza-
tions — a measure of rigidity. The deaf differed only when
verbal aspects were involved, such as adequate categorizations
accompanied by inadequate verbalizations or the categorization
of words. On such verbal measures the deaf adolescents
consistently resembled those younger hearing subjects which
were matched on language achievement, thusly indicating that
the deaf's linguistic retardation falls along normal develop-
mental lines. No differences were found between deaf and
hearing adults on any of the employed verbal and nonverbal
measures. Similar support comes from Kates (1969)8
Deaf Ss were as able as hearing Ss
matched on age, IQ, and socioeconomic
background in learning and using
logical concepts, and superior to
hearing Ss matched on written
language comprehension, IQ, and
socioeconomic background in learn-
ing these concepts. Verbal language
comprehension apparently does not
possess an exclusive determining
influence in learning and grasping
the significance of these concepts.
In consonance with these findings, Anthony Moore's
(1968) deaf adolescents were inferior to age-matched hearing
subjects on tasks which involved linguistic aspects. On the
other hand, when the cues on a conceptual discovery task were
primarily of a visual nature, the same deaf pupils made
significantly fewer errors than the hearing.
Many of these investigators of the deaf offer direct
and strong statements in support of my thesis that there is
thought without and independent of language (Furth I964, I966,
Kates et ali 1962(a), Kates I969, Blanton 1968).
Possibly the most striking naturalistic documenta-
tion of thought occurring without language is provided by
animals and pre-verbal children. The child solves problems
and interacts in a meaningful and adaptive manner with the
environment, without recourse to a linguistic symbolic code.
I do not hesitate to apply the label of 'thought* to those
nonverbal cognitive processes which must necessarily occur
within the child. The process of memory may be the most
crucial of these cognitive processes and it may be, that
meaningful experience is impossible without this memory
process. Without memory, every stimulus would be novel and
foreign and would not lend itself to prediction and inference
or future use. William James (1950, Vol.1, PpJl<59ff) speaks
of our fiense, o f sameness which is "the very keel and backbone
of our thinking' 1
. Piaget's *object constancy 1 is achieved by
•deferred imitation* which "...is an observable symbolic
activity which, as it were, enlarges the scope of the known
object by extending its identity or permanence in time and
space. limitation is thus the first true symbol " (Furth I966,
p.l?9» my underlining) «> It should be obvious that this
imitative symbolic coding of the external object cannot be a
linguistic coding. The term 'imitation* itself indicates
that the symbol consists of those neural activities which
occur in the act of perception. The ability to keep these
neural excitations active, to store them as a code, and to
reactivate them during a subsequent encounter with the given
object in order to obtain a match, results in recognition.
Recognition allows the perception of a stable world, and it
is only after objects have achieved this constancy, that a
verbal label cr,n be associated with them.
For Piaget (i960, p. 32), action and sonsori-motor
experience are the source and medium of intelligence, and
Inhclder et al. (I966) theorize that even operational thought
may be a new coordination of perception and action, rather
than being based on linguistic development* Quite in accord-
ance with Plaget's notion that the levels of cognitive devel-
opment have to preceed the use of certain linguistic opera-
tions, Furth (1966, p. 200) and Kates et all (1962a) express
that language in itself is one of the main subjects of the
learning process of the child, and that "... it seems hard
to assume that language is one of the main determinants of a
learning process where it itself is the central material
being learned" (Kates et al. 1962a, p<>30).
While we find abundant evidence documenting that
thought does occur without language, the independence of
these two processes is also demonstrated by the fact that
language does not necessarily affect thinking. Herriot (1970)
observes that "iiiovert language is pretty well developed
syntactically by the age at which children still think in
chain complexes" and that "grammatical skill is almost com-
plete by the age of five i.'ii while formal operational thought
••e is not normally attained until puberty, and operational
thought in general until seven or eight" (Herriot 1970, p.131)
Inhelder and Piaget (196^, p. 293) conclude that the use and
comprehension of linguistic terms, such as "all" and "some"
depend on the child* s level of development of operational
behavior, and this behavior has its own 'laws, of equilibration
independent of language. Ervin- Tripp and Slobin (I966) report
that "... a study of conservation of quantities by Sinclair
8and Inhelder, 1963^ showed that training children to give
the verbal formulation characteristic of the more advanced
stages produced no changes in cognitive performance".
A different consideration supporting the point at
issue here, stems from the observation that";., one sentence
may express different thoughts, one thought may be expressed
in different sentences" (Vygotsky 1962, p. 149). This obser-
vation points to the independence of thought and language,
as well as to the supremacy or priority of thought over
language, and Vygotsky (I962, p.150) pronounces that ".<,.
in our speech, there is always the hidden thought, the sub-
text".
In conclusion of this section we note that the poets
have separated thought from language — usually at the expense
of the latter — independent of psychological experimentation.
For Bergson, thought was 'pure* and was distorted by words,
Tjutchev proclaimed that "a thought once uttered is a lie"
(from Vygotsky I962), and Chinese fortune cookies tell us
that "one picture is worth a thousand words". For Norman 0.
Brown (I966, p. 257) "the fall is into language"; Kahlil
Gibran preaches to the scholar: "You talk when you cease to
be at peace with your thoughts" (I969, p.60)„ Aldous Huxley
(1954) advises us to "intensify our ability to look at the
world directly and not through the half opaque medium of
concepts, which distorts every given fact into the all too
familiar likeness of some generic label or explanatory
abstraction", and Goethe, correcting the biblical quote above,
writes assured; "In the beginning was the Deed".
A whole world view, namely Zen Buddhism, begins and
ends with this negation of language. It is language which
dichotomizes, separates, distorts and creates insoluble para-
doxes. Satori, or enlightenment "... is knowledge of the most
adequate kind, only it cannot be expressed in words" (Suzuki
1956, p. 104). "The highest truth is unfattainably deep, is
not an object of talk or discussion, and even the canonical
texts have no way to bring it within our reach. Let us once
see into cur own original Nature and we have the truth, even
when vie are quite illiterate, not knoviing a word • . .
"
(Suzuki 1956, p. 88). Upon enlightenment, Zon monks burn their
books and the master Mumon comments (Reps, p. 114):
When the mouth opens
All are wrong.
The Usefulness of Language.
In spite of the previous considerations, it cannot
be denied that language is of extreme usefulness to the life
and thought of man. The most obvious advantage inherent in
language is the communication that it allows. Experience
and direct symbolic representation as it occurs in imagery
are of necessity private and specific, and only a public and
general coding system, such as language (gestural comnunica-
10
tion could also be classified as language), permits different
organisms to refer to • common 1 experiences. It is in this
sense that vygotsky writes: "... a thought unembodied in
words remains a shadow" and "a word is a microcosm of human
consciousness" (I962, p. 153), meaning that we share our
heritage and collective awareness only by way of communica-
tion.
The communicative aspect of language may have an
effect on thought through the process of cognitive socializa-
tion (Kates et al. 1962a). Communication allows the concen-
sual validation of cognitive processes, thereby speeding up
the individual's development, as well as bringing his exper-
iences and intellective activities more in agreement with that
of other members of his culture. This aspect may be a two-
edged sword. V/hile culture and society undoubtedly enrich
the individual's experience, stereotyping and de-individuali-
zation are the by-products (Huxley 195^> Schactel 19^7, Bower
1970).
An important aspect of language is its cueing or
directing function. I have already indicated my disagreement
with the deterministic Uhorfian view. English speakers are
able to distinguish the same three kinds of snow that the
Eskimo distinguishes, even though the former use the same
word in all three instances (3rown "and Lenneberg 195^) •
Language does not determine perceptual experience, but rather
vice versa. The Eskimo's experience is such, that different
11
snow qualities may play an important role in his life; thus,
he came to use three different labels. On the other hand,
since English speakers do have only one word for any kind of
snow, they are less liable to pay attention to different snow
qualities, even though they can distinguish between them. In
other words, the informational input may be the same for both,
but the English speaker is less liable to use this specific
information (Henle 1958). Thus, language does have some
&ireotional Power over thought. In Luria's (1959) words:
"A word gives rise to new temporary connections in the brain
and directs the system of activity of the child that has
mastered it". It is this aspect of language which prompts
Mesthene (1964) to proclaim that "language makes us know".
In Mesthene* s framework, language functions as 'agent in the
process of inquiry 1
,
it allows us to formulate a hypothesis
about an unexperienced event, which we can then verify in
actual experience, thereby leading to a 'new instance' and
increasing our knowledge of reality. "Past operations are
formulated propositionally. The internal structure of the
discourse that these propositions constitute permits deriva-
tion of further propositions which are not descriptive of
occurrences already observed" (p. 107). An illustrative
example may be the strictly linguistic concepts of negativity
and passivity.
12
Language is general and public as compared to a
non-verbal cognitive code such as imagery, which is specific
and private. The word is a superordfnate; it refers to a
class of experiences which are specific for each individual.
This generality of language allows the use of deduction in
respect to generalizing and reasoning, whereas an imagery
code permits only inductive reasoning, the comparison of
specific instances with other specific instances. Deduction
is a much more powerful method than induction; it is easier,
faster, and leads to greater certainty. This superiority of
deductive reasoning facilitated by language is repeatedly
demonstrated in transfer tasks (Pyles 19 32, Kuenne 19^6,
Kates I969 )• The transfer of learning to a novel situation
is facilitated by language.
So far, I have argued that language is not
necessary for thought, but that it is useful (Herriot 1970,
Furth I.966, Lenneberg 196^). It may be better to regard
language not as external and opposed to thought, but as one
of the cognitive coding systems which constitute thought.
Thought consists of certain neural activities (Kebb 19^9
»
I966), the reception, transmission and storage of informa-
tional codes. Language is one of these codes and, as we
have seen, a useful but not an essential one.
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Cognitive Coding Systems.
"Practical experience is a precondition of intell-
ectual activity" says Mesthene (1964), thereby expressing
what John Dewey (1929, 1938) and Albert Camus (1965) have
conveyed in their own ways. Without experience we would not
have knowledge, yet, it is only through the latter that the
former gains meaning. In order to interact with the environ-
ment in a meaningful way, an organism needs a representational
or symbolic coding system, the identification of external
objects by symbols (Lawrence 1953, P0I89).
Imagery* The most immediate and basic of these
codes is the one that occurs upon perception of the outside
world, the direct neural representation of the percept. This
code applies to all sensory modalities, and 1 proposed to call
it the 'sensory coding system 1 ; 'imagery' is the term employed
extensively in the literature. Every perceiving organism
inevitably uses this code, and I propose that it is this code
which is the basis of all thought and which makes sophisticated
cognitive activities possible even in the absence of language.
It is probable that some of the same neural activities which
are elicited during the perception of an object are also
involved in the processes of storage and retrieval (Bower 1970,
Neisser I967). In summary, I refer to this code as the primary
cognitive code, because
14
a. it is the immediate and direct representa-
tion of external reality, forming a link
between internal events and external
stimuli or referents,
b. it is used in the absence of any other
codes, whereas the reverse is impossible,
i.e., imagery is necessary and sufficient
for cognitive processes, and
c. it is used before any other code in terms
of development of an organism as well as
on the phylogenic scale.
With higher ranking on the phylogenic scale and
with greater maturity, organisms increasinly use sophisticated
abstractions of the basic sensory representation. Abstracted
codes are less stimulus dependent, and through easy manipula-
tion of their symbols they allow a great variety of combina-
tions (Herriot 1970, Bruner 1964). We have already seen the
advantages inherent in the generality and publicity of such
abstractions.
Pi-Qtor_ial^^de. This code consists of pictures,
which are a somewhat general and certainly a public represen-
tation of specific individual experiences. This code may be
largely an external phenomenon, used for expression and
communication, rather than being an extensively used internal
neural representative system, and research of this question
may be indicated. On the concreteness-abstractness dimension,
15
pictures fall between the sensory code and language. The
mental image of a dog portrays a specific dog with specific
characteristics, the picture of a dog may contain only those
few essential features which differentiate a dog from other
animals; nevertheless, the picture indicates a certain sized
dog, with certain proportions, certain length and position of
tail and ears, long hair or no hair, engaged in a certain
activity,, A variety of actual instances may be represented
by such a picture. The word 'dog 1
, on the other hand, places
no restrictions on the referent, except its differentiation
from other animals. In turn, the word •animal' is at a level
of abstraction that the pictorial code is unable to represent.
Memory for pictures has been shown to fall somewhere between
the memory for objects and the memory for words (Paivio 19 69,
Bower 1970).
Auditory linguistic oode> As already indicated,
language is a very powerful abstracted code. I postulate
that language is not a direct coding of actual experience,
but that the word is referring to the neural perceptual
representation of that experience, i.e., the word's referent
is the corresponding imagery (Laffal 19 65, p. 3, Brown R.W.
I958). A label can only be applied or elicited after the
pre-attentive neural processes have been identified, and this
identification occurs in the synthesis of a perceptual image
(Neisser I967). Language is basically carried in an auditory
fashion (Blanton 1968, Neisser 1967, pp. 3^,103, Norman I969,
16
pp. 128, I36). The evolutionary history of man, the learning
history of a single individual, the impressive evidence of
the phenomenon of auditory confusions (Conrad 196^, Conrad
and Hull 1964, Wickelgren I965, 19 66, I969), as well as the
superior performance with auditory linguistic stimuli as
compared to visual linguistic stimuli (Murdock I966, I967,
I968, I969) support such a view.
3Qj?J^JLJL ing.ili.gt i 0
i
code . This code consists of a
visual symbolization of the auditory linguistic code. In
its external, public form, this code facilitates more
extensive communication, otherwise it may have little life
of its own. To use this code, it has to be decoded into the
auditory linguistic code upon reception and encoded from
that code for purposes of production (Neisser I967, p. 226,
Norman 1969 S PP»128, 136,137) . A series of experiments by
Murdock (I966, I967, 1968, I969) gives credence to this view.
Murdock (I969) summarizes that the auditory modality has
been shown to be superior to the visual modality with paired
associate lists as well as with serial lists, with mixed as
well as with pure lists, and when tested for recall as well
as for recognition.
Gestural code. Finally, there may also be a
gestural code. As with the pictorial code and the visual
linguistic code, this symbolic system may function primarily
in an external, communicative manner, rather than being an
important medium of 'thought'. I suspect, that gestures
17
are a further abstraction of language, in the sense that a
certain two-handed sweeping gesture stands for the verbal
concept 'big*. However, gestures could also be conceived
of as a more direct abstraction from the imagery code, and
in parallel to the auditory linguistic code. In the case
of the deaf, the gestural code may gain even more importance
as possible language mediator (Odom et al. 1970). Further
research may be indicated, in order to determine the status
of the gestural code, as well as to draw a more complete and
more accurate picture of man's cognitive coding systems in
general.
The Function of Imagery in Memory and Learning
In a previous research outline I proposed to show
the superiority of the imagery code over the linguistic
codes, as tested in a STM recognition task, using colors as
imagery stimuli and color words as linguistic stimuli.
Such positive findings seem to be well documented (Paivio
et al. 1968, Paivio I969, Bower 1970 ). Objects and pictures
are memorized better than their labels or words in general
(Kirkpatrick 1894, Ducharme and Fraisse 1965* Lieberman and
Culpepper I965, Jenkins et al. I96?) • This superiority
must be due to non-verbal aspects, since words can be read
faster than objects can be named (Fraisse 1964, Jensen and
Rohwer I966). Bower (1970) concludes that the usual finding
that concrete sentences are remembered better than abstract
18
sentences, even when their verbal components are equated
and controlled for (sound, syllables, number and type of
letters), must be due to non-verbal imagery* Paivio (I969)
reports extensive and consistent findings that imagery is
an effective and preferred (Paivio and Yuille I969) media-
tor in paired-associate tasks where at least the cue is of
a concrete nature. Imagery instructions have yielded con-
sistent improvements of memory and learning on a variety of
tasks (Hulicka and Grossman I967, Paivio 1968, Bower, in
press). The ancient strategy of using imagery as a
mnemonic device, rests on the implicit assumption that
memory for concrete objects is superior to memory for
words, and the reader can test this notion himself, by
following the 1 one-is-a-bun* technique as described in a
dramatic account by Miller, Galanter and Pribram (i960,
pp.l25ff).
In summary, it seems to be clearly documented
that man's coding facilitation of external objects and
events decreases in the following order: 1, actual objects,
2. pictures of objects, 3. names of objects (concrete words),
4. names of concepts (abstract words) (Paivio I969 » Bower
1970). This coding facilitation is a function of imagery,
i.e., memory and learning (= cognitive processes) are enhan-
ced with an increase in subjects' "imagery ability (Kuhlman
i960, Steward I965, both in Paivio I969) and their use of
imagery, and with an increase of the imagery evoking value
19
of the stimulus. Paivio at al. (19 68) and Paivio et al.
(1966) showed that it may not bo the meaning-fulness of a
stimulus, a measure called »m', which determines learning,
but rather the imagery evoking value of the stimulus, a
measure called 'I*
.
Of course, these two measures have a
high correlation, as we would expect, namely .72 (Paivio
1969). When these two measures were varied independently,
i.e., varying one measure while holding the other one con-
stant, •I 1 emerged as the factor most responsible for
learning.
Various theories and assumptions are being offered
in view of these findings. The two-process theory of assoc-
iative meaning and mediation (Paivio I969) states that imag-
ery is predominantly used with concrete stimuli, while
verbal mediation is preferred for abstract items. An illum-
inating finding in this respect comes from Atwood (I969, in
Bower 1970): visual interference was .greatest when subjects
were visualizing concrete items, whereas auditory interfer-
ence was greatest when subjects were visualizing abstract
items. This theory does not exclude the possibility of
imagery mediation of abstract stimuli, and McDonald (I967,
reported in Paivio I969) showed that such imagery may be
used effecti/ely. With many more years of research I hope
to substantiate my suspicion that even abstract thinking as
it occurs with the use of abstract language may be anchored
in the concrete imagery of its referents.
The dual coding assumption (Bower 1970) implies
that concrete stimuli, e.g., objects and pictures, can be
coded in imagery as well as in a verbal code, whereas more
abstract items, from concrete to abstract words, are
increasingly restricted to only one code, namely the ling-
uistic code. Somewhat of a cross-product of the two-
process theory and the dual coding assumption is the avail-
ability assumption (Paivio 1969)1
Image arousal in the case of pictures
and verbal coding in the case of words
have the highest availability, the ver-
bal code to pictures second, imagery
to concrete words third, and images to
abstract words fourth. Thus, the
summative availability of both, codes
is highest in the case of pictures,
intermediate for concrete nouns, and
lowest for abstract nouns (p. 257).
These explanations are consistent with the inter-
pretation that the superior coding of concrete stimuli as
compared to abstract stimuli is ' ... a function of the dif-
ferential availability of concrete imagery as a supplemen-
tary coding system
. (Paivio 19$9> P»257)» While such
availability of imagery may be a function of individual
differences (Kuhlman i960, Stewart 1965? both in Paivio 1969)5
I contend that the use of imagery when comparing populations,
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as well as the relative facility with imagery compared to
language within populations, may be a function of population
parameters. This approach may be especially fruitful in
view of the reported "failure of individual differences to
be predictive of memory in the research on imagery in the
early part of the century ..." (Paivio I969).
The Problem.
Two such population parameters which are hypothe-
sized to affect the absolute as well as the relative facil-
itation with imagery and with language are deafness and age.
1^ "j- s possible that the deaf have more
facilitation with imagery than the hearing. Blanton (I968)
notes that the deaf have "excellent visual memories" and he
even points to similarities with eidetic imagery. In inves-
tigating word-association patterns, Blanton (I968) found
that the deaf use more word-to-object associations than the
age matched hearing subjects, while word-to-word associations
were more prevalent in the latter group. This may indicate
that the deaf tend to concretize their language, thereby
increasing their use of the imagery coding system. The data
of Kates e" al. (1962a) lend support to this interpretation
Their deaf adolescents used more concrete verbalizations
than the age-matched as well as the language-matched hearing
subjects. Concrete words are more liable to evoke imagery
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(Paivio I969), and the deaf»s greater use of such words may
reflect their greater use and facilitation of imagery. On
a conceptual discovery task involving predominantly the use
of visual cues? Moore's (1968) deaf subjects made signifi-
cantly fewer errors than the age and IQ matched hearing
pupils,
Blanton (I968), in speculating on the relationship
between verbal and non-verbal comprehension systems, states:
"Perceptual units would probably be more frequently employed
where the encoding of perceptions into words is difficult".
I assume that such difficulties exist for the deaf, who are
handicapped in their language acquisition and language devel-
opment. As a consequence, the weight of their thought pro-
cesses should be carried by the imagery code.
Facilitation with a cognitive code, as reflected in
performance scores, and the inferred reliance and dependence
on such a code, are closely interrelated concepts. One could
argue that greater proficiency of a code is achieved through
increasing use (reliance, dependence) of that code, while the
antithesis could also be defended, namely that the greater
use of and dependence on a given mode of thought is the
result of the proficiency of this mode. Both these processes
are undoubtedly at work* However, I do not believe that the
deaf perform better with imagery, as hypothesized, merely
because they' are by nature more proficient with this code
and consequently make more use of it. I would rather explain
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this superiority — if found — as a result of the deaf's
necessarily greater dependence and reliance on imagery as
a cognitive code.
This greater dependence of the deaf on imagery as
a cognitive code should not only differentiate the deaf's
absolute proficiency with imagery as compared to the hearing.
We may also compare the relative proficiency with imagery as
compared to language for the deaf and the hearing. In other
words, since I postulate that the deaf are more dependent on
their imagery coding than the hearing are on their respect-
ive imagery code, I hypothesize greater differences to exist
between the relative usage and proficiency of the deaf's
imagery and linguistic codes, than to exist between these
codes for the hearing. Consistent with this view is the
finding of a dissociation between words and their referents
for the deaf (Kates et al. 1962a). We remember that the
deaf adolescents were equal to the age-matched hearing peers
in adequacy of categorization of objects. When categorizing
words, however, the deaf did significantly poorer than the
age-matched hearing. Performance of the deaf deteriorated
when going from categorization of objects to categorization
of words, whereas the age-matched hearing subjects performed
either better or equally well with the words than with their
referents. The same trend of dissociation shows in measur-
ing the width of categories, the deaf using more categories
for words than for objects, while the hearing peers evidenced
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the opposite. Kates et al. (1962a) postulate this dissoci-
ation to fall along normal developmental lines, since the
deaf's performance resembled that of the younger language-
matched hearing. Further testimony for this dissociation
of words and objects in the case of the deaf, is the find-
ing that the deaf had significantly more adequate categori-
zations accompanied by inadequate verbalizations than the
age-matched hearing.
Age. Age is thought to be another variable which
affects cognitive processes. It is possible that younger
persons think more in imagery than older persons, such
differences being especially potent in the earlier develop-
mental stages and decreasing with the advent of adulthood.
This heavier reliance on perceptual coding may de due to the
relative language deficiency as well as to the lesser degree
of cultural indoctrination. Bower (I970) speculates that
the child may rely greatly on imagery , but may learn to pre-
fer linguistic coding, which has the side-effect of leading
to conceptual stereotyping. This notion was expressed earl-
ier by Schachtel (19^7) who noted that the freshness and
"real significance" of childhood experience becomes increas-
ingly replaced by conventional and culturally described
stereotypic ways of experiencing. Huxley (195*0 talks at
length about the adverse effects of this social indoctrina-
tion. Support for my suspicion that younger age groups may
have a relatively livelier imagery code than older age groups
2 5
comes from the investigations of eidetic imagery. Haber and
Haber (I964) found eight percent of their sample of 151 ele-
mentary school children to experience eidetic images, whereas
this trait seems to occur extremely rarely among American
adults (Neisser I967). Again, apart from the obvious increas-
ing importance of language with age, cultural reasons have
been offered? "... the capacity for vivid imagery has little
survival value and less social acceptability" (Holt, 196^, p.
262). This cultural explanation is supported by Doob's
(1964) finding that eidetic imagery was quite common among
rural Nigerian adults, and uncommon among urban members of
the saiae tribe.
In this present study it may not be possible to com-
pare the imagery ability of younger children with that of an
older group, since I am employing a memory task* I expect
the older children to perform better on such a task because
of their greater memory capacity and possibly other factors,
such as greater alertness, confidence, more proficient memory
strategies, etc. In this case, no inference can be made
about the amount of imagery utilized by either group, and no
hypothesis is stated in this regard. Only in the unlikely
case that the younger perform better than the older in the
high-imagery condition, would I find strong evidence for the
notion that the younger make more extensive use of imagery
than the older.
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On the other hand, it can be hypothesized that the
relative facilitation with imagery as compared to language
is greater for a younger age group, Differential memory ca-
pacity does not affect this wi thin-group comparison* It is
in this respect that the Bower-Schachtel-Huxley speculations
should show up. Younger children with less language profic-
iency and less socialization should depend on their imagery
code as compared to their linguistic coding to a greater
extent than older children. Phrased differently, the percen-
tage of thought processes conducted via the imagery code out
of the total amount of thought processes, should decrease as
a function of increasing age. Again, some justification for
this hypothesis comes from Kates et al. (1962a) with their
finding of a dissociation between words and their referents
for younger children in comparison to older children. In
their inferiority on categorization of words as compared to
categorization of objects, in their greater number of cate-
gories required for words than for objects, as well as in
their greater frequency of adequate categorizations accompan-
ied by inadequate verbalizations, the younger age group
resembled the older language-matched deaf group.
£sM^2£il§^-:M^fiS£« No difficulty should exist in
the prediction of the additive effects of deafness and age.
If my previous hypotheses are justified, then an obvious
further prediction should be to the effect that the differ-
ences of facilitation between imagery and language should be
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greater for a younger deaf group than for an older hearing
group. The effects of both deafness and younger age on the
relation between imagery and language were hypothesized to
fall into the same direction.
It is more difficult to predict the effects of
deafness and age when these two variables are expected to
work in opposite directions. We may ask, which factor is
more potent, deafness or age, in determining the relative
stress of imagery versus language? In looking for an answer,
the comparison of the older deaf group with the younger
language-matched hearing group would be a sensible starting
point. These two groups have presumably equal language pro-
ficiency, thus, differences in their facilitation with imagery
should not be due to language differences. If age is the
more potent variable, the younger hearing subjects should
place more stress on their imagery code relative to their
linguistic coding than the older but deaf subjects. If
deafness is the stronger variable, it should override the age
effect, and older deaf subjects should evidence greater
imagery-language differences than younger hearing subjects.
And thirdly, of course, the effects may be equal.
There is no strong evidence indicating either
direction. The reported dissociation between words and their
referents was similar for the deaf group and the language-
matched hearing group (Kates et al. 1962a). Blanton (I968)
also reported similar word association patterns for these
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two groups. The predominance of word-object associations
over word-word associations was shown by the deaf as well as
by the younger hearing. On the other hand, we remember that
deaf adolescents used significantly more concrete verbaliza-
tions than either the age-matched or the language-matched
hearing subjects (Kates et al. 1962a). While concrete words
are liable to evoke more imagery than abstract words, as
previously discussed, I would also speculate that the use of
concrete language may be an indication of the use of imagery.
In other words, the higher occurrence of concrete verbaliza-
tions among the deaf as compared to the younger hearing may
indicate that the former make more relative use of their
imagery code than the latter.
On intuitive grounds I would also favor such a
speculation. Younger subjects, according to my theoretical
discussions, rely more heavily on imagery because of their
relative language deficiency and their lesser extent of social-
ization. With age, more and more weight is put on the ling-
uistic code, and the gap between imagery and language is
narrowed. In the case of the deaf, such language development
begins much later and progresses much slower. For a longer
than usual time the deaf rely and depend on imagery as a cog-
nitive coding system. Such initial and prolonged strengthen-
ing of the imagery code in the deaf may not be offset by later
language development to the same degree as for hearing persons*
Since socialization may be one factor unfavorable for extensive
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use of imagery, it should be noted that deaf adolescents are
probably less communicative
, even though they may possess the
same proficiency with language, than the language-matched
hearing subjects. The deaf have less opportunity for social-
ly validating their cognitions, and their thought processes
may be more idiosyncratic and •closed* (Kates et alo 1962a).
Such egocentrism may point to a strong prevalence of the
imagery code, since it is this code which is so uniquely
tailored for private experience. In summary, I would predict
that deafness may have a greater impact than age on the
relative importance of imagery as compared to language.
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Hypotheses
1. Total recognition scores in a short term memory task will
be higher when
a. the stimuli consist of colors than when the stim-
uli consist of color-words,
b. the stimuli consist of color-words than when the
stimuli consist of abstract low- imagery words,
c. the stimuli consist of colors than when the stim-
uli consist of abstract low-imagery words.
2. The recognition scores in a short term memory task using
colors as stimuli will be higher for the deaf groups
than for the hearing groups matched on age, IQ and socio-
economic background.
3» There will be greater differences between
a. the recognition scores for color stimuli and color-
word stimuli,
b. the recognition scores for color-word stimuli and
abstract low-imagery word stimuli, and
c. the recognition scores for color stimuli and abs-
tract low-imagery word stimuli
for the deaf than for the hearing.
^. There will be greater differences between
a. the recognition scores for color stimuli and
color-word stimuli.
b. the recognition scores for color-word stimuli
and abstract low-imagery word stimuli, and
c. the recognition scores for color stimuli and
abstract low-imagery word stimuli
for the younger groups than for the older groups.
There will be greater differences between
a. the recognition scores for color stimuli and
color-word stimuli,
b. the recognition scores for color-word stimuli
and abstract low-imagery word stimuli, and
c. the recognition scores for color stimuli and
abstract low-imagery word stimuli
for the younger deaf group than for the older hearing
group
•
There will be greater differences between
a. the recognition scores for color stimuli and
color-word stimuli,
b. the recognition scores for color-word stimuli
and abstract low»imagery word stimuli, and
c. the recognition scores for color stimuli and
abstract low-imagery word stimuli
for the older deaf group than for the younger hearing
group matched on language comprehension, IQ and socio-
economic background.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
Four groups of 1? adolescents per group were
employed* The first group was drawn from the lower ages
of the Middle School of the Clarke School for the Deaf in
Northampton, Massachusetts. These pupils had a mean age of
eleven years. Only deaf subjects with hearing losses of ?0
decibels or more in the better ear, who have hearing par-
ents, and whose onset of deafness occurred before the age
of three, were included in this study. The Clarke School
for the Deaf trains its students in the oral method, dis-
couraging handr-s4gtta3rs-. Due to the scarcity of subjects
and due to the loss of one boy out of the original experi
mental group of 18 subjects, the sexual balance in this
group was slightly tipped: this group consisted of 10
girls and 7 boys. We will refer to this group as the
younger deaf group.
adolescents selected from the Florence Grammar School in
Northampton, Massachusetts, and matched with the first
group on the variables of age, IQ and socioeconomic back-
ground. This group consisted of 9 girls and 8 boys. A
measure of language comprehension was obtained from the
subjects comprising the second group, based on the average
The second group consisted of an equal number of
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of the word and paragraph meaning scores of the Stanford
Achievement Teste This group will be referred to as the
younger heading group or as the language matched hearing
group
•
The third group consisted again of deaf adoles-
cents drawn from the Clarke School for the Deaf, and
matched with the previous groups on the variables of IQ
and socioeconomic background. This group was also matched
with the younger hearing group on their language compre-
hension. It may be interesting to note here, that an
estimation of the level of language comprehension for this
group has been employed successfully. The Stanford Achieve-
ment Test is administered bi-annually to all students in
the Clarke School for the Deaf, for the purpose of assess-
ing their linguistic progress. In order not to interfere
with this testing cycle, this group's level of language
comprehension at the time of this study was estimated from
their most recent test scores (November 1970) and from
existing data about their rate of linguistic progress.
This procedure had been used successfully on two previous
occasions (Kates, personal communication). At the time of
this study, the actual current Stanford Achievement Test
scores were obtained. Although the estimated scores were
Invalid for most individuals, for the group as a whole the
predicted mean score and the actual mean score were almost
identical (5*78 and 5.80 respectively). After the matching
of language comprehension with the younger hearing group,
this present group had a mean age of 16.4 years . This
group, as the second group, consisted of 9 girls and 8 boys.
I will refer to this group as the older deaf group or as
the language matched deaf group.
The fourth group consisted of hearing adolescents
from the Northampton High School and the John F. Kennedy
Junior High School, both in Northampton, Massachusetts.
This group was matched with all other groups on IQ and so-
cioeconomic background, and matched specifically with the
older deaf group on age* Again, this group consisted of 9
girls and 8 boys. I will refer to this group as the older
hearing group.
The matching of IQ of these groups had been in-
tended to be based on the Picture Arrangement, Block Design
and Coding subtests of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
children and the corresponding subtests of the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale for subjects over the age of 16.
It had been indicated that the deaf and the hearing do not
differ significantly on these particular subscales (Levine
1956) j and a variety of studies of the deaf have employed
this matching procedure (Kates et al, 1962a, Moore I968,
Kates I969). These performance-IQ subscales have been
employed in the matching of both deaf groups and the older
hearing group. In the case of the younger hearing group,
the performance scores (nonverbal) of the school-adminis-
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tered Otis-Lenon Mental Ability Test were used, since the
subjects in question were not available for any additional
time.
The Hollingshead scale (1957) was used to provide
a numerical rating of the fathers 9 occupations for matching
the groups on socioeconomic level. Although the hearing
groups did yield somewhat lower mean scores for this vari-
able, the appropriate t-tests did not reach the
.05 signifi-
cance level
o
No subjects were employed in this study who had
physical disabilities other than deafness in the case of
the deaf, or who showed emotional disturbance. All subjects
were screened for adequate color vision, using the Ishihara
color plates.
Subjects of all groups were selected from the
respective school records. In the case of the older hearing,
voluntary cooperation was then requested from these adoles-
cents, and none of them refused. The public schools in-
volved in this study, i.e., the schools supplying our hear-
ing subjects, required the parents of the selected youngsters
to give their permission for participation in the experiment.
Again, no parents refused to sign the letter that we com-
posed for this purpose (Appendix A).
Originally, 18 subjects had been included in each
experimental group. One boy was eliminated from the younger
deaf group, after displaying acting out behavior during the
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experiment. One boy of the older deaf group left school on
the day of the experiment and was not available for testing.
On the last day of testing the younger hearing group, one
boy had forgotten his glasses and could not see the stimuli
used during testing. In order to balance the groups, one
boy with strikingly low experimental scores was dropped
from the older hearing group. The matching of the result-
ing four groups, containing 17 subjects each, is shown in
Table 1.
The last three groups, namely a deaf group, an
age-matched hearing group and a language-matched hearing
group, are often employed in research of the deaf, based on
the method of Kates et al. (1962a) (Kates I969, Moore I968).
This design allows the assessment of the effect of deafness,
when the deaf group is compared to the age-matched hearing
group. In comparing the deaf group with the language-matched
(younger) hearing group, statements could be made about the
effects and quantitative aspects of language development.
No valid statements about age effects could be made from
this comparison, since age and deafness were confounding
variables and alleged age effects could well be due to qual-
itative effects of deafness. In order to assess the effect
of age, different age groups within the deaf and hearing
groups have to be compared. It is for this reason that a
younger deaf group, matched on age with the younger hearing
group is included in the present study.
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TABLE 1
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR AGE, IQ, SOCIOECONOMIC
BACKGROUND AND WRITTEN LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION.
Group Agea IQ SE D . LA 0
Younger deaf
M 13205 109.35 3.29
SD 6:90 10.11 1.77
Younger Hearing
M 130.82 109.17 3.94 5.87 •
SD 5.^7 10.79 1.15 .56
Older Deaf
M 196.35 107.29 3.05 5.87
SD 11.46 10.11 1.72 1.34
Older Hearing
M 196.58 108.00 3.82
SD 11.03 9.02 1.75 /
Note: N = 17
a - in months.
b - Hollingshead Socioeconomic Index
c - Stanford Reading Achievement in grade level
I
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In summary, there are four groups i two deaf groups
at two age levels and two hearing groups at those same two
age levels, with the older deaf group being matched on lang-
uage comprehension with the younger hearing group. This
design allows a powerful investigation of the effects of deaf-
ness and age, since each variable is assessed and compared at
two levels. Statements about deafness are based on the com-
parison of the deaf with the hearing at two different age
levels (11 years and 16.4 years), and statements about age
effects are based on comparing younger with older subjects in
two qualitatively different conditions.
Stimulus Materials.
The stimulus materials consisted of three sets of
14 4x6->inch cardboard cards. These cards were white on the
side showing the stimulus, and gray on the reverse side. The
first set consisted of two identical series of seven colors as
stimuli, one side of each card showing a single color in its
entirety. The colors have been chosen for their unambiguous
verbal coding and for their monosyllabic labels. The follow-
ing colors were included: red, blue, green, black, brown,
white and gray. Color is in itself a precious and rare stim >
ulus. It appeals directly to the imagery code, i.e. percep-
tion of a color results in direct sensory representation, not
ruling out the possibility of additional verbal coding. The
I
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color is in itself a referent without being a bulky object.
Only geometrical figures may possess similar stimulus qual-
ities.
The second set of stimuli consisted of two iden-
tical series of the corresponding seven color-words • RED,
BLUE, GREEN
,
BLACK, BROWN, WHITE, GRAY. Memory for these
words should rest principally on the capacity of the ling-
uistic cognitive coding system. Since these words are
highly concrete and have intuitively a high imagery evoking
value, dual coding may occur here, too. During pilot work,
children as well as adults frequently reported experiencing
color imagery with these words.
A third set of two identical series of seven stim-
uli was employed, consisting of abstract low imagery-evoking
words, matched with the color-words on number of syllables
and approximate frequencies of occurrence (Thorndike and
Lorge 19 The selection of these words has been done in
close cooperation with experienced teachers and researchers
of the deaf, insuring that the youngest deaf pupils were
familiar with the use of these stimuli. The following list
has been composed: HOPE, MIND, TIME, LAW, FACT, COST, TRUTH.
The frequencies of all verbal stimuli as well as the avail-
able imagery evoking values (Paivio et al. 19 68) are listed
in Table 2.
In summary, the three sets of stimuli should
differ in their appeal to the imagery code and to the ling-
to
TABLE 2.
FREQUENCIES ACCORDING TO THORNDIKE & LORGE (I9W AND
AVAILABLE IMAGERY EVOKING VALUE »I« ACCORDING TO PAIVIO,
YUILLE & MADIGAN (I968) OF THE EMPLOYED VERBAL STIMULI •
Stimulus G T L Stimulus G T L I
RED AA M M TIME AA M M 4.1
GREEN AA M M HOPE AA M M 3*8
BLACK AA M M MIND AA M M 3-0
WHITE
"
AA M M LAW AA M 871 3.7
BLUE AA M 989 FACT AA 700 M 2.2
BROWN AA 600 M COST AA 700 903 3o6
GRAY AA 700 891 TRUTH AA 700 698 2»7
3*3 = Mean
The column under »G» states the word's occurrence per million
words. An entry of •AA 1 indicates 100 occurrences or more
per million. The columns under »T« and •L 1 give the number
of occurrences in approximately 4§ million words of the Thorn-
dike general count of 1931, and the lorge magazine count re-
spectively o An •M l in the T column means that the word was
one of the 500 commonest by the Thorndike count, and occurred
from 800 to 100 000 or more times per tyj million words. An
•M* in the L column means that the word occurred 1000 times
or more in the Lorge magazine count. The column 'I' gives
the Paivio et al. (1968) imagery evoking values. The
obtained Mean of the I's of 3.3 can be considered a low
imagery evoking value.
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uistic code. Colors should be coded primarily in the form of
imagery, but verbal coding may also occur. Color words should
travel predominantly in a linguistic code, but may evoke
imagery as well. There should be less imagery coding and more
linguistic coding involved with the color-words than with the
colors. This trend is followed further in the abstract words,
which should be restricted even more to the linguistic coding
system and which should have less, if any, opportunity to
give rise to imagery, especially in the present design where
stimuli were presented fairly rapidly and imagery of these .
words was not encouraged. Thus, the assessment regarding cog-
nitive codes was done in a gradual fashion. Performance with
colors was compared with performance with concrete words, and
the latter was contrasted with abstract words. The same
hypothesized relationships should hold in both instances. An
over-all measure was the comparison of the extremes on this
continuum, namely, colors versus abstract words. Differences
in performance with these stimuli were attributed to the use
and capacity of the imagery code on the one hand and use and
facilitation of linguistic coding on the other hand.
In addition there were 18 3x3-inch cards with num-
bers ori them. Subjects were required to count, in order to
insure a no-rehearsal delay in the chosen procedure. All
numbers were below 100, and it was insured that this did not
exceed the counting capacity of the youngest deaf children.
k2
Procedure.
Subjects were tested in groups of three in a room
at their respective schools. Each such group contained mem-
bers of both sexes, i.e. a group consisted either of two
girls and one boy or of two boys and one girl. Upon enter-
ing the room, the adolescents sat down at a long table with
spaces between themselves, facing the experimenter. In most
cases, rapport between subjects and experimenter had been
established at the previous IQ-testing and language-testing
sessions. This rapport may have been slightly different with
the older hearing as compared to the older deaf group. For
many older deaf students, recent IQ scores had been available
for the purpose of matching the groups, and no meeting before
the actual experiment had been necessary. As a result, the
experimenter met many of these adolescents for the first time
when they walked into the testing room. The older hearing
students, on the other hand, had had two opportunities to
establish a cordial relationship with the experimenter, in
addition to the circumstance that verbal communication was
facilitated with this group. This imbalance may have been
partially remedied through the experimenter's assistant who
was familiar to and on friendly terms with the deaf adolescents
but a stranger to the hearing students before the experiment.
A further measure of improving rapport with the older deaf
subjects was employed by giving them some candy before the
testing. Rapport with all of the younger children was
excellent; they were also promised to receive a candy-bar
after the test. During the experimental situation itself,
all groups received the same treatment. Communication was
restricted to the written instructions, demonstrations and
gestures, and occasional vocalizations when necessary.
Upon being seated, each subject received the first
instruction card from the experimenter's assistant.
CAED I.
This is not a school test.
Don't worry.
Do the best you can.
The experimenter himself was standing behind a table
facing the subjects at a distance of about 3| yards from the
subjects. On the table in front of him was a display panel,
also facing the subjects, and at a distance of 3 yards from
the subjects' seats. The instructions were conveyed through
a combination of typed instruction cards and corresponding
demonstrations by the experimenter. If the test series for a
particular group began with the color stimuli, the next
instruction card read as follows.
CARD II.
I will show you some colors.
Think about the pretty colors.
Do not say the names of the colors.
I will put the colors on the table.
Remember where I put them.
When the subjects looked up after reading the card,
the experimenter held a stimulus card in a vertical position
in front of him, with the side consisting of the color stimu-
lus facing the subjects. Then he placed the card face down on
the display panel, so that the subjects could only see the
gray back of the card. He would repeat this procedure for
all seven stimulus cards, placing them in a row on the dis-
play panel, from the subjects' right to left. Then the
assistant placed the next instruction card in front of each
subject.
CARD III.
Then I will show you a number.
You say the number. Begin with that number and count
as fast as you can count.
When I show you a color, stop counting.
Now the experimenter held up one of the 3x3~inch
cards showing a number. He and the assistant counted out
loud starting with the shown number, and with appropriate
gestures they persuaded the subjects to do likewise. After
all three adolescents had apparently understood the task at
hand and were counting out loud rapidly, the experimenter
dropped the card with the number and in its place presented
a pre-designated duplicate of one of the seven color cards.
The subjects stopped counting and received the next instruc-
tion card along with an answer sheet (Appendix B) from the
assistant
c
CARD IV
Now guess which card on the table has the color like
this one.
Now look at the Examples on your paper.
There are seven boxes in each row.
There is a box for each card on the table.
The first box is for the firs't card on the table,
and the last box is for the last card on the
table and so on.
Now let's do Example 1.
Mark the box that has this color.
Example 1.
-After subjects had marked oheir answer, the correct
answer card was turned over. This act was usually followed
by general excitement. The experimenter and the assistant
would spend as much time as necessary to insure that all sub-
jects understood this scoring procedure correctly. Then the
experimenter assembled all stimulus cards and rearranged them
for the next practice trial, while the assistant presented
the next instruction card.
CARD V.
Let's do it again.
I will put 7 colors on the table.
Remember where I put them.
Then begin to count from the number that I show you.
V/hen I show you a color, stop counting.
Now guess which card on the table has the color like
this one.
Then mark your answer next to Example 2.
Ready?
After the subjects indicated their understanding,
a test trial of the actual experimental procedure ensued.
The experimenter presented and exposed each of the seven
colors for about one second, placed it face down on the dis-
play panel and promptly presented the next color. The pre-
sentation time was made roughly identical for all cards with
the aid of a metronome. The experimenter had built a small
portable metronome which he carried in his pocket and which
delivered a loud periodic click by way of an earplug, inaud-
ible to anyone else. Immediately after presentation of all
seven memory stimuli, the experimenter started a stop watch
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with his right hand and presented a 3x3-inch number card with
his left hand. The subjects read the number and continued
counting out loud. After exactly 3 seconds the experimenter
dropped the number in his left hand and exposed the probe card
with his right hand. The subjects stopped counting and pro-
ceeded to remember and score the matching color card among the
cards on the display panel. After all subjects scored their
responses, the experimenter turned the correct card over and
again insured that the scoring procedure was properly under-
stood.
It was considered very important to insure the sub-
jects' proper understanding and to diminish their insecurity,
which may be a salient factor especially with the deaf (Kates,
Yudin and Tiffany 1962b) and with the younger hearing children.
At this point an attempt was made to dissipate any remaining
signs of ambivalence. Then the next instruction card was
presented.
CARD VI
o
Be very careful.
Let's see how many you can get right.
Remember, do not say the names of the colors.
Just think about the pretty colors.
Now the actual testing began. Eight trials were
conducted identical to the second practice trial. After show-
ing the memory probe at the end of each trial, the experimenter
waited 15 seconds before assembling the stimulus cards from
the display panel. Following the fourth and the eighth trial
the correct answer card was exposed to the subjects after they
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had made their choices. This procedure was believed to main-
tain the subjects 1 interest and to provide incentive. Had
the correct card been exposed aftei each trial, many subjects
would probably have become discouraged by the difficulty of
the task.
After eight trials with the color stimuli, the next
stimulus condition was introduced with the following instruc-
tion card.
CARD VII.
We will continue like this.
Nov/ each card will have a word on it.
I will show you the words before we begin.
Think about the words. Do not say them.
The experimenter exposed all seven word cards on the
display panel to the subjects, so that the latter would become
familiar with the new stimuli. Eight trials were conducted
with these words, whereupon the last stimulus condition, the
other set of words, was introduced with the corresponding
instructions and demonstration.
CARD VIII.
We will continue like this.
No w the cards will have different words on them.Ml WW ii—WM f-— i ii ri mm p i m ' ' * I —i
I will show you the words before we begin.
Think about the words. Do not say them.
In case the first experimental stimulus condition
consisted of either the color words or the abstract words, the
instructional procedures were identical as those described
above, except that all occurrences of 'color* or 'colors'
were replaced by the appropriate reference to 'word' or 'words'.
Each change of stimulus conditions was announced by the appro-
1
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priate instruction card and by exposure of the new stimuli.
The instructions were typed double spaced on 5x7-
inch index cards, each sentence making up a separate line.
These instructions had been selected and phrased in close
collaboration with experienced teachers and researchers of
the deaf and geared toward to level of comprehension of the
younger deaf pupils employed in this study.
As already mentioned, eight trials were conducted
with each set of stimuli. Within these eight trials, six of
the seven stimuli were probed at least once and two of these
six were probed twice. This tactic was designed in order to
make it difficult for subjects to devise strategies to pre-
dict the next stimulus probe. The position of the stimulus
probe was handled in a similar manner; six of the seven pos-
itions were probed at least once and two of these six occured
twice within the block of eight trials. The order of the
probed positions and the order of the probed stimuli as well
as the order of all seven stimuli within each separate trial
were balanced for each eight-trial block of any stimulus
condition. For our three stimulus conditions there were six
ways of ordering these conditions. The balancing of stimuli
and positions, as described in detail above, was carried out
across these six possible combinations of the stimulus con-
ditions. Since the children were tested in small groups of
three, it was possible to test each threesome of a particular
subject group with a unique combination of the stimulus con-
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ditions, as well as with a unique arrangement of all stimuli
and of all probed stimuli and positions. This balanced
treatment was equated for our four subject groups.
One slight mistake occured in regard to the bal-
ancing of the probed stimulus positions. It was discovered
after the experiment that the abstract words were probed 16
times in the first and last positions, whereas the color-
words were probed 14 times in those end positions and colors
only 10 times. This treatment was, of course, identical for
all subject groups and thus, did not cloud the comparison of
subject groups with each other. It may, however, have influ-
enced the overall comparison of stimulus conditions. It
could be argued, for example, that the colors constituted a
more difficult condition than the other two, because of the
fewer number of end positions. Thus, the actual differences
between colors and abstract words and between colors and
color-words may possibly be somewhat greater than those
found in this experiment. This error was due to the last
minute reduction of the number of trials from ten to eight
per subject per condition.
Each subject received a total of 24 trials, eight
trials of each stimulus condition, and the total time spent
by subjects in the experimental room was approximately 30
minutes. The testing of our hypotheses was based on 136
observations per stimulus condition per subject group.
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The present procedure has been derived from exten-
sive pilot work with deaf and hearing adolescents, as well as
some testing with college adults. Various paired-associate
tasks had been employed, but were abandoned in favor of the
card-guessing technique described by Calfee (I969). Using
this technique, the obtained recognition scores were deemed
to be too high to leave room for variation and for meaning-
ful comparison So With the aim of reducing the accuracy of
recognition without, however, introducing confounding factors,
several variations of this card-recognition method were tested.
The stimulus list was lengthened, stimulus response time was
shortened and a delay condition was introduced. Extensive
discussion of this exciting work is furnished in Appendix C.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Hypotheses.
Hypothesis One was not supported. Overall recog-
nition scores were not significantly different for the colors,
color-words or abstract words. The overall main effect due
to stimulus condition, with F( 2,128) = 1.57, did not achieve
significance (Table 3). Although there was a weak indication
of the predicted direction, this tendency only reached the .1
level of significance (F(l,128) = 3. 11) when comparing colors
and abstract words (Myers I966, Chapter I3). Table 3 entails
the analysis of variance for the two-between and one-within
variable appropriate to our experimental design. Table 4
gives the means and standard deviations of the experimental
groups for their performance with the three types of stimuli.
Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the total recognition
scores obtained in the experiment. All raw scores for the
experiment are listed in Appendix D.
Hypothesis Two was not supported. Recognition
scores of all deaf adolescents for colors were not signifi-
cantly higher than those for all hearing subjects. Although
the two younger groups t alten alone seem to indicate the pre-
dicted direction (Figure 1), the F(l,32) = 1.9, which is
clearly not significant.
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Table 3.
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE TOTAL EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
, WITH
TWO BETWEEN (AGE, HEARING) AND ONE WITHIN (STIMULI) VARIABLES.
Source Sam of Squares df Mean Square F P
A 46.1225 1 46.1225 20.49 .001
H 0.5931
,J
1 0.5931 .26 •
C 6.7059 2 3.3529 1.57
AH 8.2402 1 8.2402 3.67 .1
AC 3.5686 2 1.7843 .84
HC 1.2157 2 O.6078 .29
S(AH) 143.9216 64 2.2488
AHC IO.I569 2 5.0784 2.85 .1
SC(AH) 273.0196 128 2.1330
A as Age
H = Hearing-Deafness
C = Stimuli
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TABLE /+•
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS
IN REGARD TO THEIR PERFORMANCE WITH COLORS, COLOR- WORDS AND
ABSTRACT WORDS.
GrouP Colors Color-words Abstract words
Younger deaf
M 3.06 2.47 3.O6
SD 1.55 I.65 1.55
Younger hearing
M
;
2.4-7 3.00 2.24
SD 1.50 1.49 1.20
Older deaf
M 3.76 3.65 2.82
SD 1.71 1.60 .87
Older hearing
M 4.29 3.76 3.71
SD 1.42 1.13 1.56
1
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FIGURE !•
SUMS OF RECOGNITION SCORES OF FOUR EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS FOR
COLORS, COLOR-WORDS AND ABSTRACT WORDS.
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older deaf
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•••• younger deaf
Colors Color»Wor£s Abstract Words
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Hypothesis Three was not supported. Differences
between recognition scores for the three stimulus conditions
were not significantly greater for bhe deaf than for the
hearing. There was only a weak interaction between the var-
iables hearing-deafness and the stimuli (HC), with F(2,128)
= .29 (Table 3). Individual contrasts computed for each age
level separately did not yield significance. The difference
between color-words and abstract words for the younger groups
reached the .1 level of significance, with F(l,64) = 3.65.
This indication of a difference, however, pointed in the
opposite direction than predicted. In other words, the
younger deaf group was hypothesized to do much worse with the
abstract words than with the color words, when compared to
the younger hearing, but our finding was that the younger
deaf performed even better with the abstract words than with
the color words.
Hypothesis Four was not supported. Overall, the
younger groups did not evidence greater differences between
their recognition scores for the three types of stimuli than
the older groups. The interaction between the variables of
age and stimulus conditions (AC) was low, with F( 2,128) =
.84 (Table 3). The highest level cf significance achieved
by any individual contrast is only. .2 in the case of compart-
ing the performance on colors with the performance on ab-
stract words. This weak indication of a tendency points in
the opposite direction than predicted, i.e. the older groups
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performed somewhat poorer with the abstract words than with
the colors, whereas the younger groups showed no difference
in their performance with these stimuli.
The differences between the performance of the
younger and the older was computed separately for the deaf
and for the hearing. Only the difference between performance
with color words and performance with abstract words in the
case of comparing younger and older deaf children fell
between the .1 and .05 significance levels. This tendency
was again in the opposite direction, i.e. the older deaf
performed poorer with abstract words than with color words,
as predicted, whereas the younger deaf showed the reverse.
The interaction between the variables of age and stimulus
conditions for the deaf alone did not reach significance,
with P(2,64) = 1.89 (Table 5).
Hypothesis Five was not supported. The differences
between performance with any of the stimuli was not greater
for the younger deaf than for the older hearing. Comparing
these two groups at any one stimulus level did not yield
significance.
Hypothesis Six was not supported. The differences
between performance with the three types of stimuli were not
greater for the older deaf group than for the language-
matched younger hearing group. Although the difference
between performance on colors and performance on abstract
TABLE 5.
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE YOUNGER AND OLDER
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square
A 7. 6863 1 7.6863
C 4.0?84 2 2.0392 .89
S(A) 71.0588 32 2.2206
AC 8.7843 2 4.3922 1.89
SC(A) 148.4706 64 2.3199
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words was greater in absolute numbers for the older deaf
than for the younger hearing, namely 16 and 4 respectively,
this difference did not reach significance. A separate
analysis of variance was computed for these two groups.
The interaction between the group differences (age and hear-
ing combined) and the different stimulus conditions were
non-significant, with P(2,64) = .58 (Table 6).
Post Hoc Analyses.
Stimuli. The experimental hypotheses, except
Hypothesis Two, address themselves to the effects due to the
three types of stimuli and to the interaction between the
stimulus effects and other variables. The hypothesis of
an overall stimulus effect was not supported at the .05
level of significance, although a tendency at the .1 level
of significance pointed in the predicted direction* No
effect due to the stimulus conditions could be found when
comparing the younger groups alone. Figure 1 may convince
the reader quickly of the futility of such a search. A
separate analysis of variance was computed for the older
groups, and the indication of a tendency emerged here. Stim-
ulus effects barely missed the .1 level of significance for
these groups, with F(2,64) = 2.3I (Table 7). Comparing
their performance on colors with their performance on ab-
stract words yielded F(l,64) = 4.6, which was significant at
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TABLE 6.
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR DEAF AND HEARING GROUPS MATCHED
LANGUAGE ACHIEVEMENT.
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square P p
H 18.1275 1 18.1275 9.25 .005
c 11.5^90 2 5.7745 2.56 .1
S(H) 62.8627 32 I.9645
HC 2.6078 2 1.3039 •58
SC(H) 143.8431 64 2.2475
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TABLE 7.
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE OLDER DEAF AND OLDER HEARING
GROUPS MATCHED ON AGE.
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F P
H 6. 62?5 1 6.6275 3.25 .1
C 10.0196 2 5.0098 2.31
8(H) 62.7059 32 1.9596
HC 2.4902 2 1.2451 •58
SC(H) 138.8235 64 2.1691
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the
.05 level of significance. There was also an indication
of a stimulus effect when comparing the older deaf group
with the language matched younger hearing group, with F(2,
64) = 2.56 reaching the .1 level of significance (Table 6).
In summary, the overall stimulus effects were in
the predicted direction, but weak; when taking the older
groups alone, these stimulus effects grew stronger, travel-
ing on the margin of significance (see also Figure 2).
Age. There was a great overall effect due to age
(Figure 2), This effect was significant beyond the .001
level, with F(l,64) = 20.49 (Table 3) • Since there was only
a tendency for an age effect among the deaf, with F(l,32) =
3.46 falling between the .1 and .05 levels of significance
(Table 5) the hearing groups were assumed to carry the brunt
of the overall age effect. The deaf age groups did differ
significantly at the .05 level only in regard to their per-
formance with color-words, with F(l,32) = 5« 29» It was in
regard to just these color-words , and only in regard to these,
that the two hearing age groups failed to achieve a signifi-
cant difference, with F(l,32) = 2.21. Figures 3 and 4 show
in graphical form the age differences for the deaf and hear-
ing separately.
Hearing. No overall differences due to the vari-
able of hearing-deafness were observed (Figure 5), with F
(1,64) - .26 (Table 3). Such hearing effect was especially
absent in regard to the younger groups. Averaging the
FIGURE 2.
SUMS OF RECOGNITION SCORES OF OLDER AND YOUNGER AGE GROUPS
FOR COLORS, COLOR-WORDS AND ABSTRACT WORDS
100 _
90 -
Colors Color-Words Abstract Words
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FIGURE 3.
SUMS OF RECOGNITION SCORES OF OLDER AND YOUNGER DEAF GROUPS
FOR COLORS, COLOR- WORDS AND ABSTRACT WORDS (DETAIL FROM
FIGURE 1).
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FIGURE 4
SUMS OF RECOGNITION SCORES OF OLDER AND YOUNGER HEARING GROUPS
FOR COLORS, COLOR-WORDS AND ABSTRACT WORDS (DETAIL FROM FIGURE 1)
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FIGURE 5.
SUMS OF RECOGNITION SCORES OF THE COLLECTIVE DEAF AND HEAR-
ING GROUPS FOR COLORS, COLOR-WORDS AND ABSTRACT WORDS
•
hearing groups
deaf groups
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scores of the younger groups at each stimulus condition
placed these groups on an identical straight line; individ-
ual contrasts for the younger groups at any single stimulus
level remained non-significant. Taking the older groups
alone, an indication of a hearing effect emerged, with F
(1,32) = 3.25 being significant at the .1 level. The indi-
vidual comparison of the older deaf and hearing subjects in
regard to abstract words yielded F(l,32) = 2.9/1, which
reached the .1 level of significance.
Age-hearing interaction . There was a tendency
toward an overall age-hearing interaction, with F(l,64) =
3.67 well exceeding the .1 level of significance (Table 3).
The part played by the older groups in this interaction
reached the .1 level of significance, with F(l,128) = 2.9^-
(Figure 6). The interaction between the variables of age
and hearing became evident in regard to the abstract words
alone, where F( 1,6*1-) = 5«04 achieved significance at the .05
level (see Figure 8c and the following section dealing with
age-hearing-stimulus interaction)
.
Another view of the age-hearing interaction invol-
ved the comparison of the older deaf group with their age
matched peers on the one hand and with their language matches
on the other hand (Figure ?). There was a tendency for the
older deaf to differ from their hearing age peers, with F
(1,32) = 3.25 reaching the .1 level of significance (Table
6). This tendency seemed to be due mainly to the differences
6?
FIGURE 6.
SUMS OF RECOGNITION SCORES OF OLDER AND YOUNGER DEAF AND
HEARING GROUPS FOR ALL STIMULUS CONDITIONS.
130 -
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FIGURE 7*
SUMS OF RECOGNITION SCORES OF THE OLDER DEAF GROUP AND THEIR
AGE-MATCHED HEARING GROUP AND THEIR LANGUAGE-MATCHED HEARING
GROUP (DETAIL FROM FIGURE 1).
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FIGURE 80
SUMS OF RECOGNITION SCORES OF OLDER AND YOUNGER DEAF AND
HEARING GROUPS FOR COLORS (a.), FOR LOLOR-WORDS (b.) AND
FOR ABSTRACT WORDS (c).
- hearing groups
-- deaf groups
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of these groups in regard to abstract words, where F(l,32) =
2.9^ was significant at the .1 level* This same deaf group,
however, differed significantly frcn the language matched
younger hearing group, with F(l,32) = 9.25 achieving signi-
ficance at the .005 level (Table 6). Beside the overall
difference between the older deaf and the language matched
younger hearing, these groups differed significantly in
their performance with colors, with F(l,32) = 7.26 exceeding
the .025 level of significance.
Age-hearing-stimulus Interaction . There was an
indication of an overall interaction between the variables
of age, hearing and stimulus conditions (AHG), with F(2,128)
= 2.85 falling between the .1 and .05 levels of significance
(Table 3). This interaction seemed to be due mainly to a
significant interaction between age and hearing in regard to
abstract words, F( 1,6*0 = 5.0^ being significant at the .05
level. Figure 8 shows the age-hearing interaction for each
of the stimulus conditions.
Error Analysis.
An extensive analysis of the errors made by all
subjects wa~ conducted. It was be?ieved that if certain
errors occurred significantly more often than other errors,
this would possibly give an indication about some response
bias or mediation process employed by the subjects. The
occurrence of particular errors would be especially inter-
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esting if such errors were made at list positions further
removed from the correct answer.
Most errors were made one cr two positions removed
from the correct response. The mean positions removed per
error fell between 1.82 and 2.33 for the different subject
groups and for the different stimulus conditions. Figure 9
shows the number of errors made at each distance from the
correct response, graphed in curve form for each subject
group. Superimposed is the hypothetical curve that would be
expected if the positions of errors were a matter of chance.
SslS&JL* The error data regarding color stimuli
are given in Table E(l) of Appendix E e Errors reaching an
overall significance (t-test for errors within subject
groups) of occurrence at the .05 level included black- brown
and red-green errors, i.e. one member of such a pair was
chosen with significant frequency as the answer, when the
other pair member was the correct answer. Black-brown errors
were also significant at the .05 level for the deaf collect-
ively and for the younger hearing group. These same errors
achieved significance at the .025 level for the younger deaf
group. Red-green errors were significant at the .05 level
for the deaf collectively, and at the .01 level for the older
deaf alone.
Although the overall number of gray-white errors
did not quite reach significance at the .05 level, it may be
worthy to note that these frequently made errors occurred on
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FIGURE 9,
NUMBER OF POSITIONS OF ERRORS REMOVED FROM THE CORRECT ANSWERS
UNDER ALL THREE STIMULUS CONDITIONS FOR THE YOUNGER DEAF (a.),
THE YOUNGER HEARING (b.), THE OLDER DEAF (c), AND THE OLDER
HEARING (d.).
colors
color-words
abstract words
... hypothetical curve obtained if the posi-
tions of errors were a matter of chance.
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the average throe or more positions removed from the correct
response. The older hearing group made a significant number
of gray-White errors at the
.05 level. The only other signi-
ficant errors at the .05 level were green-white errors for
the younger hearing group and blue-red as well as black-red
errors for the older hearing group.
BQl9V-mV&S,* The error data regarding color-words
are given in Table E(2) of Appendix E. There was a striking
significant occurrence of BLACK-BROWN errors for all subject
groups. The significance levels were the following:
.05
for the younger deaf, .01 for the older deaf, and .005 for
the deaf collectively;
.005 for both hearing age groups, and
.001 for the hearing collectively. Overall significance of
this error compared to all other errors was at the .01 level.
For the younger deaf, RED-GREEN errors occurred
with a frequency at the .05 level of significance. Both old-
er groups, the hearing as well as the deaf, made frequent
BLUE-GREEN errors at near positions, reaching the .05 level
of significance.
Abstract words . The error data regarding abstract
words are given in Table E(3) of Appendix E. The only error
pair that came close to an overall significant occurrence,
but missed the .05 level of significance by a fraction, was
the pair TRUTH-HOPE. This error occurred with significant
frequency at the .025 level for the deaf collectively as woll
as for the older deaf group alone.
7k
Both deaf groups together also made frequent HOPE-
MIND errors, significant at the .05 level, this type of
error reaching the .025 significance level for the younger
deaf
c
COST-MIND errors occurred with a frequency at the
•05 level of significance for the younger deaf and at the
.01 significance level for the older hearing. The younger
hearing made significantly frequent MIND-TIME errors at the
.05 level of significance.
Analysis of Accuracy
Across all subject groups there were 9 values
exceeding 50% recognition in regard to individual color stim-
uli • In comparison 5 values above $0% accuracy occurred in
regard to color-words, and 6 such values were found vrith
the abstract words, k of these 6 being contributed by the
older hearing group. Table F in Appendix F shows the recog-
nition accuracy achieved with colors, color-words and abstract
words respectively.
Colors * Overall, the color red was remembered and
recognized best in comparison to other color stimuli. The
younger deaf group achieved 65^ accuracy with this color.
Both older groups performed with ar. accuracy of $0% or bette~
in regard to the colors gray and green, the older hearing
scoring 60% recognition of gray, and the older deaf recogni-
zing the color green 6yfo of the time when the end positions
were excluded and only the more difficult middle positions
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were considered. The strongest score was 7k% recognition
of brown by the older hearing group. The younger groups
performed poorly in regard to the color black.
£2l2£=]30T&s. The word RED was recognized 65% of
the time by the older hearing group. Both older groups
scored 60fo in regard to WHITE, and both deaf groups achieved
50% accuracy or better with BLUE. The younger deaf performed
poorly with BLACK, recognizing this word only two times out
of the 1? times that it was probed.
Abstract wo^fla. The younger deaf performed best
in regard to the stimulus FACT, recognizing it 53% of the
time. The older deaf exceeded 50% recognition with the stim-
ulus COST. The older hearing group performed well with the
stimuli FACT (71^), LAW (65^), TIME {55%) 9 and TRUTH (50%).
This group, however, did remarkably poorly in regard to COST,
recognizing this stimulus only twice out of the 17 times that
it was probed.
.^i&LZP^MPJL- Recognition accuracies were also
computed for each stimulus position. Serial position curves
typical for memory experiments were obtained (Figure 10).
It may be noted that the colors prompted a marked recency
effect when compared to the color-words. In regard to the
abstract words, the two deaf groups performed identical,
showing both recency and primacy effects. There was a dif-
ference, however, for the hearing groups. While the older
hearing showed a primacy effect but no recency effect, the
76
FIGURE 10
RECOGNITION PERCENTAGES OF ALL EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS FOR EACH
SERIAL POSITION OF THE STIMULI
, WHEH THE STIMULI WERE COLORS
(a.), COLOR-WORDS (b.), AND ABSTRACT WORDS (c).
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younger hearing demonstrated a recency effect but no primacy
effect.
In addition to the described data analyses, we
also computed a correlation matrix for all the variables
measured in this study* This table is listed in Appendix G.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Hypo theses
.
The first hypothesis, which predicted that overall
recognition scores would be highest for colors, lowest for
abstract words, with color-words falling in between, cannot
be rejected in face of the overwhelming previous demonstra-
tions (Paivio I969, Bower 1970). In the present experiment
there was a consistent indication of the predicted direction
regarding this hypothesis. This indication emerged in the
overall analysis, in the separate analysis for the older
groups and in the recognition values for individual stimuli.
Although the experimenter was most confident in respect to
this hypothesis, the indicated tendencies were not signifi-
cant. The reasons for this failure may be manifold. First,
the error that occurred in balancing the serial positions of
the stimulus probes may have led to better performance with
the color-words and especially with the abstract words. Had
these latter stimulus conditions not been favored in the easy-
to-remember end positions, the hypothesized trend would prob-
ably have been greater. Second, the performance of both
younger groups and of the older deaf group with respect to
the abstract words may have clouded the picture by introduc-
ing confounding factors. The younger deaf performed surpris-
ingly well with the abstract words, surpassing their age-
1
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matched hearing peers, and equalling the older deaf who were,
on the average, about five years older. I will speculate
below that the abstract words may have been handled in other^
than-linguistic ways, especially on the part of the younger
deaf. Had the abstract viords been mediated by strictly ling-
uistic coding processes, as predicted, the hypothesized trend
should have emerged stronger. Third, a greater number of
observations could have produced the needed significance for
our positive tendency. Each experimental group yielded I36
observations for each of the three stimulus conditions. The.
number of subjects was restricted due to the limited number
of available deaf adolescents, and the number of observations
per subject were limited by the duration of the experimental
sessions and by the time involvement that could reasonably
be demanded from the participating schools and from the
subjects themselves.
The remaining hypotheses dealt with differences in
performance due to either deafness or age or both of these
variables. In general, the indications that emerged were
weak. Other indications, while also lacking statistical sig-
nificance, were pointing in the opposite direction than pre-
dicted. I will briefly discuss some possible reasons for
these negative findings for each of the remaining hypotheses
separately. Since these explanations may apply to all or
most of the following hypotheses, they shall receive more
detailed attention in a subsequent discussion.
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The second hypothesis, which predicted that the
deaf would be better with imagery than the hearing, was not
substantiate. It is at least theoretically possible that
the collection of more observations could have yielded the
predicted results, especially in view of the younger deaf's
performance in the predicted direction. It is also possible
that the color stimuli may not have adequately tapped the
subjects 1 imagery code, as postulated, but that these colors
may have given rise to at least partial linguistic mediation.
That this mediation may have been more pronounced for the
older deaf than for the younger deaf is consistent with the
interpretation offered by Lantz and Lenneberg (I966).
Finally, the deaf's postulated imagery superiority may act-
ually not exist — a possibility probed in further detail
below.
Hypothesis Three, regarding the relative differ-
ences between imagery and linguistic coding for the deaf
and the hearing, was not supported. Undesired 'noise* in
the experiment could have led to this failure. Those parts
of the hypothesis involving performance with abstract words
may have been clouded by the unexpected findings regarding
those words. And again, failure to show differences may be
due to the absence of such differences.
Under Hypothesis Four, predicting greater differ-
ences between facility with imagery and with language for
the younger than for the older, we found no differences
c
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As before, interfering side-effects and the possibility of
unpredicted non-articulatory mediation in regard to abstract
words may have had an influence here, Or we may regard our
hypothesis as refuted; in which case the importance of
imagery as a cognitive code may not decrease with age, but
may continue to be the most crucial cognitive factor for all
age groups. In that case, we should, indeed, find no widen-
ing of the gap between imagery and language facility over age.
Hypotheses Five and Six did not fare better. As
previously discussed, the reasons for this ill fate may in-
clude experimental shortcomings, special handling of the ab-
stract words by some subject groups, and the counter-hypothe-
sis that imagery may not be decreasing in absolute as well
as in relative importance with increasing linguistic profic-
iency due to age or due to hearing. Let us now evaluate in
more detail these possible explanations for our failure to
achieve significant and predicted findings.
More . obs erya.t i on
s
• It is possible that the collec-
tion of more observations per subject group per stimulus con-
dition could have carved out a cleared picture. On the other
hand, and especially in the face of some of our unpredicted
indications, an increase in data may not have helped to sup-
port our hypotheses. While I accept the notion that more
data are certainly desirable, and may even be necessary in
the case of .weak effects, I will reject this possibility as
the sole explanation for our non-significant findings.
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Procedural shortcoming, it is believed that the
present design of a recognition memory experiment is appro-
priate for the attempt of answering questions that deal with
thinking. The definition of « thinking 1 may rise or fall with
the presence or absence of such processes that we call •mem-
ory 9
.
The activities occurring during the latter process -
either on the concrete neurological level or on abstract con-
ceptual levels - should occur during the former process*
Investigators in general seem to agree with this proposition
(Conrad 19?0, Furth 1971)
•
It could be postulated that the employed stimulus
material did not tap the proposed mediating processes* Such
criticism is not without value. Lantz and Lenneberg (I966)
speculated that linguistic skill may facilitate color recog-
nition in deaf adults, whereas deaf children's color categor-
ization may develop according to different rules. Y/hile dis-
cussing the stimulus materials above, I conceded that verbal
mediation may occur during memorization of colors, and it is
theoretically possible that greater verbal facility may lead
to better performance with colors. On the other hand, the
error and accuracy patterns, as discussed below, are seen to
give some indication that imagery, as postulated, may have
been employed during the recognition of colors. From the
standpoint of designing the present experiment there should
be no reason to doubt that the remaining stimuli, namely
color-words and abstract words, would be tapping the subjects 1
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linguistic coding system. If I am speculating below that some
subjects may have experienced other-than-linguistic mediation
with regard to abstract words, then I am doing this with the
spirit and excitement of discovery, rather than regarding the
selection of stimuli as a procedural error.
The non-mechanized, almost primitive nature of the
experimental procedure itself is not seen as an important
handicap. The same card-recognition procedure, where the ex-
perimenter presents and handles the stimulus cards himself,
has been used successfully in previous research (Atkinson,
Hansen and Bernbach 196&, Hansen I965, Bernbach 196?, Atkinson
and Shiffrin 1968, Calfee 1969)0 While this procedure was
deemed fit to be used with college students (Atkinson and
Shiffrin I968)
,
it may constitute a real advantage over mech-
anized procedures when dealing with younger children. The
children were actively confronted end involved with the ex-
perimenter, which may have motivated them and maintained their
interest, rather than having to relate to an impersonal, inflex
ible experimental apparatus. Great care was taken to render
the procedure as smooth and as faultless as possible, and to
eliminate the possibility of an experimenter bias. To fin-
ally reject the possibility of a faulty stimulus handling
procedure, it should be noted that had any roughness remained
unnoticed, it would have occurred identically for all experi-
mental groups, and could not have caused systematic differ-
ences between groups.
84
Tho error which occurred in balancing the serial
positions of the stimulus probes for the three types of
stimuli has been discussed previously. Without such error,
performance with color-words and with abstract words could
possibly have been depressed somewhat for all subject groups,
as discussed with regard to Hypothesis One. While it could
be argued that such depression could have been of different
magnitude for the different subject groups, such effect would
have been negligible due to the small extent of the error.
Thus, it is concluded, that the error in balancing the stim-
ulus probes did not distort the picture regarding differences
between deaf and hearing or between younger and older subjects
o
The matching of subject groups was the most time
consuming and painstaking endeavor during this study. While
this matching was very close in most instances (Table 1), two
points could possibly be raised. First, the matching on IQ
was based on the performance subscales of the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale or on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children in the case of three subject groups, and it was
based on the performance scores of the Otls-Lenon Mental
Ability Test in the case of the younger hearing subjects.
Mainly because of the presence of a host of confounding fac-
tors in the IQ testing situation, the experimenter rejected
the possibility of having introduced a grave systematic bias
due to the employment of the two IQ tests. Second, there was
a slight difference in socioeconomic background between the
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deaf and the hearing. However, this difference was statis-
tically non-significant when comparing either groups individ-
ually or when comparing all deaf with all hearing subjects.
Furthermore, the means for all groups fall roughly into the
middle of the socioeconomic scale, where differences should
not weigh heavily.
Finally, the difference in rapport with the older
deaf group as compared to the older hearing group may he men-
tioned again. The presence of the experimenter* s assistant
and the giving of candy were factors counteracting such dif-
ference. Furthermore, there was no actually felt difference
in rapport during the experimental sessions themselves. In
any case, had such possible difference influenced our results,
this effect would have been to increase the difference of per-
formance between the older deaf and the older hearing groups.
In our experiment we found only a trend of a difference be-
tween these groups in regard to the abstract words. Assuming
that better rapport does enhance performance, the above con-
siderations would minimize even the small trend that was
found. Thus, we cannot hope that this point could possibly
explain our negative findings.
In summary, a host of imaginable procedural short-
comings were discussed. All, except one, were discredited
as possible explanation for our non-significant results.
While the speculation that linguistic mediation may play a
potent role in the memory for colors cannot be rejected.
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this hypothesis is not a preferred one. Of course, we keep
in mind the possibility that the hypothesized effects may be
so weak, that even small procedural inequities constitute
enough •noise* to drown out the faint whisper we are strain-
ing to detect.
The mediation of abstract words. As mentioned at
various points above, some puzzling performances with the
abstract words were observed. According to expectations, all
subject groups should have performed worst with these stimuli
than with the other two conditions. Also, the deaf, being
clearly inferior with language, should have performed worse
with these difficult linguistic stimuli than the hearing. To
our surprise, the younger deaf group fulfilled neither of
these predictions. Their total recognition for abstract words
was identical to their recognition for colors, while they did
poorer with color words (Figure 1). In regard to the abstract
words they surpassed their hearing age peers, and achieved a
total score identical to the latter* s performance with the
linguistically mediated color words. To complicate matters,
the younger deaf children, with a mean age of 11 years, were
clearly not inferior to their 16 year old deaf friends when
it came to abstract words. These observations prompted the
investigator to speculate that other-than-linguistic mediat-
ing processes may have been at work here. It may be possible
that the selected abstract words were too difficult to be
handled by the younger deafs» linguistic coding system.
8?
Instead, these youngsters may have attempted to remember
these stimuli in the form of visual imagery, and since they
were quit, proficient with this code, they performed well
with it, showing no differences between colors and abstract
words. This possibility is not too far fetched. Conrad and
Rush (1965) and Conrad (1970) demonstrated that some deaf
children use other than articulator mediation in response
to letters and words, this mediation possibly being visual
and based on shape. "... To understand memory processes more
fully, we have to be able to conceive of a verbal memory
store which may be full of pictures of words ..." (Conrad
1970) concludes. The younger deaf also made frequent TRUTH-
TIME errors, these errors barely missing the .05 level of
significance. It could be argued that these two stimuli
could be confused on visual grounds. This postulated visual
imagery of the words themselves should not be confused with
our imagery coding system. The former refers to the visual
perception of a written word, and we have also called this
the 1 visual linguistic code' (Introduction). Our imagery
code, on the other hand, is the imagery of the reXejrent of a
word.
The older deaf, on the other hand, may have faced
a dilemma. They may have unlearned or were in the process of
unlearning the habit of treating difficult words as visual
stimuli, and were attempting to code our abstract words ling-
uistically. It is possible, that this changeover from one
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cognitive habit to another may not have been successful as
yet, resulting in poor performance. For this group we
obtained a correlation of
.47 (barely missing the .05 level
of significance) between age and performance with abstract
words (Appendix G)
.
In other words, as this group grew in
age they became better with these stimuli, which is consis-
tent with our tentative speculations* This high positive
correlation may be especially striking in comparison with
the substantial negative correlation of ~J*5 between age and
performance with color-words for this group o Our interpre-
tation reminds of Trevoort c s (1967) theory of the deaf's eso-
teric and exoteric coding methods. Under that theory, the
deaf develop an esoteric or idiosyncratic-internal code in
order to deal with their experience. With maturation the
exoteric or linguistic code gains increasing significance
and gives rise to a competitive conflict between these two
codes.
In order not to risk the reputation of being a
conservative theoretician, I may add that the abstract words
may also have been too difficult for linguistic coding by the
younger hearing children. These children performed roughly
identically on abstract words and on colors, as had the
younger deaf group. Also, the language achievement scores of
the younger hearing had a substantial positive correlation of
.^5 with performance on color-words, whereas the correlation
of language achievement with abstract word performance reached
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only
.13 (Appendix G). In other words, linguistic skill is
reflected in this group's handling of color-words
, as expec-
ted, but does not seem to play a determining role in the
mediation of abstract words. Further support for this notion
seems to come from the serial position curve of this group's
accuracy scores. In regard to abstract words, this curve is
marked by the absence of a primacy effect, but it shows a
recency effect. This could mean that the abstract words were
not remembered or rehearsed as a verbal list.
While these bold interpretations are offered only
tentatively, it is believed that some other- than-predicted
mediation processes may have been at work for some subjects,
especially the younger deaf, in regard to the abstract words.
This circumstance may be at least partially responsible for
some of our data's unpredicted directions as well as for the
failure of some tendencies in general to achieve significance.
Especially Hypothesis Four, predicting differences in cogni-
tive processes between younger and older subjects, may have
suffered from this possible complication. I suggest that it
may be fruitful to further investigate the coding operations
that are used to deal with marginally familiar linguistic
stimuli.
No differences between the deaf and the hearing.
So far, the proposed possibilities of explaining our data's
lack of significance have been met with no great enthusiasm,
but only with lukewarm sympathy in very few cases. It may be
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time to stop looking for •what went wrong 1 and instead take
our data at face value. Abundant research, much of which
was cited in the Introduction, demonstrated no significant
differences between the deaf and the hearing. I hypothesized
some specific differences to exist, but I failed to find them.
May it not be possible that there are, indeed, no spectacular
differences between the deaf and the hearing when it comes to
the phenomenon of 'thinking 1 ?
Such a view necessitates a change in my theoretical
considerations. I had started with the finding that the deaf
are not intellectually inferior to the hearing, although the
deaf are clearly retarded linguistically. I reasoned that
such linguistic deficit led to greater use and thereby great-
er competence of the imagery coding system. A strong ling-
uistic code, on the other hand, was postulated to make no
special demands on the corresponding imagery code, resulting
in the hearing subjects' inferiority when it comes to imagery.
Loosely speaking, then, cognitive performance or intelligence
was seen as an aggregate of and somewhat of an average between
these two complementary coding systems. The average would be
the same for the hearing and the deaf, although the latter
possess an inferior linguistic system and superior imagery.
This may not be the case. It is possible that deaf and hear-
ing populations do not differ in regard to imagery. And it
may be just this equality that makes them equal intellect-
ually. In other words, the capacity of the imagery coding
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system is now seen as determining oognitive functioning.
Not by averaging with language, as postulated before, but
in and by itself.
Our non-significant findings and the view that
there may be no differences between the deaf and the hearing
in regard to imagery, are strongly supported by the most re-
cent review of the literature (Purth 1971). In general, deaf
subjects were not found to be superior to the hearing in re-
gard to recognition or reproduction of drawings, pictures,
geometrical designs, imbedded figures or imagining to view a
scene from different perspectives. These tasks are tapping
the capacity of the imagery code, mid I had even proposed
some of those tests as a follow-up to the present study. We
may conclude from these findings that linguistic deficit may
not enhance and strengthen imagery and that greater linguistic
facility may not de-emphasize imagery. Nor does greater
linguistic skill drastically enhance imagery; if it did, the
hearing should be consistently superior in cognitive function-
ing to the deaf. Thus, the growth and capacity of imagery
may simply bo a reflection of a person's experience with tho
world. Consequently age peers are performing equally well
cognitively, despite drastic differences in language. This
reminds us of Furth's (I966) interpretation that possible
differences between tho intellectual performance of the deaf
and the hearing may be explained by the deaf population's
relative poverty of experience.
92
A corresponding discussion would apply to the var-
iable of age. It is possible that the imagery coding system
may not decrease in importance over age, counter to the Bower-
Schachtel-Huxley speculations. The status of imagery may
merely decrease in obviousness and its power may be yielded
in a more subtle manner. This subtlety may be exactly what
I referred to as the 1 anchoring' of all other cognitive pro-
cesses.
Of course, it could be argued that there really are
differences in imagery between the deaf and the hearing, and
between younger and older age groups, but that the matching
procedures prevent such differences from emerging. The deaf
and the hearing subjects of these studies are usually matched
on non-verbal performance J.Q.. This procedure could be tanta-
mount to matching the subjects on imagery, which may be the
very factor under investigation. On the other hand, the
matching on performance IQ can be seen as logically consis-
tent with the view that imagery ability and intellective
ability are somewhat identical. The follcwing research pro-
posal may or may not get around this controversy. I propose .
to further investigate the role of the imagery coding system
by comparing multilingual foreign speakers with multilingual
native speakers and with monolingual native speakers. It
could be hypothesized that the acquisition and use of foreign
languages may anchor cognitive processes more firmly in the
imagery code (along, the same lines of the original theoretical
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considerations that led to this present study). All three
groups could be matched on the total IQ scores of the respect-
ive native IQ tests, rather than matching them on performance
IQ,
If I embrace the new interpretation offered in this
discussion or if I had substantiated my original hypotheses,
some far-reaching implications should be clear: imagery seems
to be the crux of thinking. Consequently, it may be sound
educational practice to train and strengthen this imagery
code in any way possible, rather than to pursue the present
and past emphasis on linguistic development and on linguistic
methods of instruction. Purth (I97I) proposes an identical
view. Or could it be that present and future mass societies
place more survival value on an extensive communication net-
work rather than on the individual's level of intelligence?
Along the same lines, it may be a timely observation that the
traditional verbal psychotherapies have not made a significant
impact. If the imagery code is the backbone of cognitive
functioning, then this code may be more conducive to cognitive
and emotional change. Consistent with this view are the en-
couraging findings of the modern 'behavior therapies', employ-
ing such techniques as covert conditioning, covert desensiti-
zation, role playing, modeling, video-tape feedback, behavior
practice and 'in vivo' desensitization. Indeed, communication
itself may be rendered more appealing to the recipient's
imagery. Our writing or speaking may be more effective when
9^
employing verbs rather than nouns, active clauses rather than
passive ones, affirmative statements rather than negative
ones, and concrete descriptions rather than abstract fabrica-
tionso
Post Hoc Analyses.
The present study found drastic overall differences
due to age. While no official hypothesis was constructed for
this point, such an effect was certainly expected, as indica-
ted in stating the problem. The age effect seemed to be more
pronounced for the hearing groups than for the deaf groups.
Various hypotheses could be offered as explanations for this
circumstance, such as the slight developmental increase in
linguistic competence by the deaf (Furth 1971). We shall re-
frain from further speculations, however, in light of the pre-
viously discussed processes that may have been responsible
for showing no differences between the younger and older deaf
groups with respect to abstract words.
No overall difference was found due to deafness.
This finding is well in accord with abundant previous research.
Comparing the two older groups alone, there was a tendency of
a differerce between the deaf and the hearing in their per-
formance with abstract words. It should be clear that any
differences between the deaf and the hearing, if they exist,
would be expected especially in regard to these stimuli.
i
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remember the notion that the language of the deaf is more
concrete and less abstract than the language of the hearing.
Nevertheless, even this one difference was not significant,
and we have explored a possible reason why the older deaf may
have performed so poorly with the abstract words.
There was a slight indication that the deaf and the
hearing behaved differently at the different age levels em-
ployed. This was especially true in regard to abstract words,
and I speculated that a change in mediating processes may
occur over age. Linguistic mediation may become more preva-
lent as the adolescent grows older s this process being more
pronounced in the hearing than in the deaf. My original theo-
retical considerations, as well as Furth's (19?1) claim of
slower linguistic progress in the deaf, as well as a specula-
tion offered by Lantz and Lenneberg (1966), seem to be con-
sistent with this interpretation. We also obtained different
serial position curves for the older and younger hearing in
regard to abstract words.
Previous research has employed the Kates et al.
(1962a) method of testing three experimental groups, a deaf
group, an age-matched hearing group and a language-matched
hearing group. Comparing these three groups in our present
experiment, our findings are consistent with established evi-
dence. The deaf were not inferior to their hearing age peers,
but performed significantly better than the language matched
hearing adolescents. The difference between the deaf and the
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younger hearing was especially evident with respect to colors.
This is exactly what we would expect according to my hypothe-
sis that imagery is the backbone of cognitive activity, and
that intellectual differences or intellectual growth should
be most clearly reflected in this imagery code* The perfor-
mance of the older deaf with abstract words fell between that
of the younger language matches and that of the age matches*
Apart from my speculation regarding this performance, it is
consistent with the notion that the deaf's possible linguis-
tic retardation falls along normal developmental lines (Kates
et al* 1962a)
•
Error Analysis
o
The findings that incorrect choices tend to be
from the neighborhood of the correct stimulus more often than
predicted by chance and that second guesses following an
error tend to be correct more often than predicted by chance
(Atkinson et al. 1964, Hansen I965) was interpreted by Cal-
fee (I969) to indicate that recognition memory may not be an
all-or-none affair. Our present error curves are consistent
with this view.
The analysis of specific errors can be a valuable
source of information if agreed-upon error categories can be
designed prior to the experiment (Conrad 1970). This has not
been done in the present case and our interpretation of the
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meaning of certain errors must be regarded as highly specu-
lative. We could make a case for claiming that imagery med-
iation did cocur, as posulated, during the performance with
colors. The frequent gray-white errors, in particular, can
not be attributed to any other than imagery confusion.
Black and brown, too, are highly confusable on grounds of
imagery, although verbal mediation underlying this error can
not be ruled out with certainty. It could be claimed that
the significantly frequent red-green errors were due to the
fact that these were the two most striking colors among the
stimuli, which is also supported by the high accuracy of rec-
ognition for these two colors. The pronounced recency effect
with colors, as discussed below, can also be seen as pointing
to imagery mediation.
With respect to color-words, no spectacular infer-
ences can be made. Articulatory coding, which would be expec-
ted here, should have led to BLACK-BLUE errors and to GRAY-
GREEN errors. Instead, we found again highly-frequent BLACK-
BROWN errors and RED-GREEN errors.
Mediation of meaning in regard to abstract words
can be ruled out because of the few TRUTH-FACT errors. MIND-
TIME errors, which were significant for the younger hearing
group, could be pointing to acoustic-verbal as well as to
visual coding. It could be argued that TRUTH and TIME may be
confused on visual grounds. This error barely missed signi-
ficance of occurrence for the deaf collectively and for the
i
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younger deaf in particular. Thus, these errors are at least
not inconsistent with our previous speculation of imagery
mediation playing a role here.
Analysis of Accuracy.
Some points coming out of this analysis were
already mentioned elsewhere in the discussion. Some meaning
may be derived from inspecting the primacy and recency effects
of the memory curves. It may be argued that a primacy effect
could signify verbal rehearsal or the retention of a verbal
list of stimuli. Recency, on the other hand, may possibly
point to visual or acoustic imagery. We should keep in mind
here that a delay condition, as employed in the present study,
usually depresses the acoustic recency effect.
Comparing memory for colors with memory for color-
words for all groups, we find a pronounced recency effect in
regard to colors. This may add fuel to our suspicion that
imagery was, indeed, an effective mediator with these stimu-
li. The observation that the younger hearing group showed
recency but no primacy in their performance with abstract
words, while the older hearing showed the reverse, may be
seen as peripheral support for the nction that different med
»
iating processes may have been active here.
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SUMMARY.
The purpose of the present study was to investi-
gate the cognitive codes that are used in the process of
thinking. Several possible coding systems were postulated,
with focus on language and imagery. While language is cer-
tainly useful in many respects, it is not believed to be
necessary for thinking to occur. It was postulated that
imagery carried the prime responsibility for cognitive pro-
cesses. The relationship between imagery and language was
hypothesized to be a complementary one, meaning that ling-
uistic deficiency or linguistic inferiority may lead to
greater use of imagery and consequently greater facility
with imagery. Specific predictions were made regarding the
absolute as well as the relative facility with language and
imagery in deaf and hearing adolescents.
A new design of four experimental groups was em-
ployed, yielding two levels of inquiry for the independent
variables of age and deafness. Deaf adolescents at two age
levels, eleven and. sixteen years old, were matched with hear-
ing adolescents on age, IQ, sex and socioeconomic background.
In addition the older deaf were matched with the younger
hearing on written language comprehension. Each group con-
tained 17 children. The stimuli consisted of colors, concrete
words and abstract words. Subjects were shown a series of
stimuli and were asked to record the serial position of a
t
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subsequently exposed memory probe.
The hypotheses were not supported. Findings were
in general non-significant, apart frcm a strong effect due
to age. Possibilities of procedural shortcoming were dis-
cussed; although they could not be rejected definitively,
they were not favored in most cases. The complicating poss-
ibility that other-than-linguistic coding may have been em-
ployed in dealing with the abstract words, at least with
regard to the younger deaf children, found indications of
support. A plausible and tentatively preferred explanation
for the non- significant findings could be that there are,
indeed, no differences between the deaf and the hearing.
Imagery and language may not be complementary coding systems,
but it may be the case that the facility with imagery is
determined by maturation and experience. The level of imag-
ery capacity, in turn, may determine or possibly even consti-
tute the level of intellective functioning, regardless of
linguistic skills. Future research possibilities were dis-
cussed, and far-reaching implications for education, therapy
and communication were speculated.
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APPENDIX A
Dear Parents and Students,
This study is part of a continuing research program involving the
Clarke School for the Deaf and various Northampton public schools. Deaf
and hearing adolescents are compared, in order to learn more about deafness,
as well as to improve elementary and secondary education.
We need a group of normal hearing students who are exactly equal in
age to our deaf students. Our two tests take about 30 minutes each; most
students have found them enjoyable. These tests are not school tests, and
the results do not become part of the school records.
Your participation on this project will be of great value to our
research.
Thank you.
Toni Farrenkopf
Research Associate
Ill
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APPENDIX C
Pilot Work.
The procedure, as described in Chapter II, has been
derived from extensive pilot work with deaf and hearing ado-
lescents, as well as some testing with college adults. First,
a paired associate task, using six colors or six color-words
as cues and using a spoken number from one to six as response,
had been employed with four college adults. Trial- to-criter-
ion scores as well as error scores were much lower in the
color condition than in the color-word condition; these scores
indicating the predicted trend. A similar paired associate
task has been employed with two deaf and eight hearing ado«
lescents between the ages of 9 and 13 years. Instead of re-
sponding orally to a given stimulus, the subjects were required
to point to one of six circles drawn on a sheet of paper. The
circles were to be replaced by response buttons in the actual
experimental procedure. Apart from some error-free and gen-
erally low-error learning, subjects were found to pay more
attention to the response aspects than to the stimulus aspects
of this learning task. Since most of the learning occurred
at the response level, no trend emerged due to stimulus differ-
ences.
The paired associate task was modified in order to
diminish response learning. A stimulus (cue) was followed by
a second stimulus (response). Subjects had to learn and pre-
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diet the second member of each stimulus pair, indicating
their choice again by pointing to a circle in front of them.
These circles had colors on them in the case of the stimuli
being colors and color-words in the verbal condition. There
was still believed to be some qualitative difference between
the responses in these two conditions, so that the importance
of response learning could not be ruled out. More important,
the trial-to-criterion scores for six pairs of stimuli were
again quite low and not suitable for meaningful comparisons.
This does not rule out that an appropriate paired associate
task could have been constructed for the purposes of this
study. However,, the paired associate procedure has been
rejected in favor of a card-recognition technique, described
by Calfee (1969).
This card-guessing technique has been used in a
variety of studies on subjects ranging from nursery school
children to college students (Atkinson, Hansen and Bernbach
1964, Hansen I965, Bernbach 196?, Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968,
Calfee 1969). In the usual procedure the subject is presented
with a series of stimulus cards, which are placed face down
after exposure. Then a probe is presented and the subject
has to indicate the corresponding stimulus card. The great
advantage of this basic procedure lies in the circumstance
that there is no limit to the number of possible trials per
subject. This procedure also allows unlimited within-subject
variation since there is no contamination from previous learn-
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ing on any trial.
Eight hearing and two deaf adolescents have under-
gone several variations of this procedure. The deaf, who
performed rather poorly, were considered not typical of the
planned deaf subject groups and they are not included in the
following considerations. Over-all recognition scores for
colors were higher (18/20 or 90$) than for color words
(10/12 or 83$), again indicating the predicted trend. When
separated into two age groups, the older children, 12 to 13
years, evidenced 100$ accuracy in both conditions, compared
to 77% accuracy in both conditions for the younger group, 9
to 10| years. It was undesirable to have such high recogni-
tion scores, since this would allow little room for variation
and for meaningful comparisons.
A modified procedure, based on the one used by
Hansen (I965) has been employed with these adolescents, in
order to suppress the high recognition scores. In Hansen's
procedure one array of stimulus cards is placed face down
after exposure. Then a second array of identical cards is
presented and placed face up in front of the subject. Then
the experimenter points to one of the stimuli in the face-up
array, and the subject has to indicate the matching card in
the face-down array. This procedure introduces a delay
between the presentation of the last memory stimulus and the
actual test, and the proportion of correct responses has been
found to be lower than in the single-array procedure.
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Performance of the pilot subjects was indeed sup-
pressed, with the older children scoring 11/13 or 85$ with
the colors as well as with the color-words, and the younger
children scoring 6/8 or 75$ with colors and 5/10 or 50% with
color-words. Although these scores were much too few to
warrant confident statements, it can be seen a. that the
younger experienced a drastic drop from colors to color-words
(75$ to 50$) 5 whereas the older showed no such drop, and b.
that the younger showed less relative loss in the color con-
dition than the older, when going from the one-array no-delay
procedure to the two-array delay procedure (77$ to 75$ and
100$ to 85$ respectively). Both these possible trends were
consistent with my theoretical predictions.
Although the Hansen (I965) procedure yielded roughly
suitable performance scores, it was noted that another variable
may have been introduced here* Since the second array of stim-
uli is largely irrelevant to the task until one of its cards
has been selected as probe, some children adopted the tactic
of not paying attention during the presentation of this second
array and verbally rehearsing the order of the face-down array
instead. Another procedure had to be found which either em-
ployed a delay without allowing rehearsal, or otherwise was
capable of lowering the scores.
A procedure in which only a single array of cards
was presented, but where the cards x-rere placed on the table in
a mixed-up order, was tried with four hearing adolescents, 11
to 14 years old. As before, six stimuli were used* Suitable
scores emerged, typically 3/5, 3/6 or V6, but the great
emphasis on ability of spatial coding may have introduced
undesired confounding factors.
Another method has also been rejected, namely
retaining the two-array procedure, but preventing rehearsal
by making the subjects overtly label or read each stimulus,
including the entire second row, upon presentation. While
it has been typically found that overt verbalizing increases
recognition in the one-array procedure (Calfee I969), I would
expect that the naming of the stimuli in the irrelevant sec-
ond row interferes with the task at hand. My pilot work in-
cluded this condition, and deterioration of performance was
indeed the outcome. Thus, overt verbalization would intro-
duce both beneficial as well as deleterious effects within
the same procedure, and it would be difficult to predict or
justify the outcome. Differential effects due to overt la-
beling of stimuli was also shown by Conrad (1970). He was
able to divide his deaf subjects into 'articulators* and
•non-articulators 9 . The former group benefitted from overt
labeling of stimuli, whereas the latter group suffered from
it.
A one-array procedure that successfully reduced
recognition scores was designed. First, the stimulus list
was lengthened by one (the color gray), and the presentation
rate shortened from about two seconds to one second. Both
11?
these methods have been reported to reduce recognition scores
(Hansen 1965, Calfee I969). Three subjects, ages 12, 13 and
Ik years scjred 15/18 or 8*$ and one 9-year old scored 3/6
or 50% across the two stimulus conditions. As an additional
technique to reduce scores, varying delays were employed with-
out, however, allowing rehearsal. After presentation of the
last memory stimulus, the experimenter named a number, and
the child counted out loud starting from the given number.
After either five or ten seconds the counting was stopped and
the memory probe was presented. The five-second delay proce-
dure reduced the scores considerably? the three older child-
ren scoring 9/18 or 50$, and the 9-year old (as well as the
12-year old whom I included in the older group) scoring 2/6
or 33$. The ten-second delay procedure reduced the older
group's score to 4/18 and was deemed inappropriate for our
purposes. In any case, the employed delay technique seemed
sensitive enough to either improve or reduce the recognition
scores at the discretion of the experimenter.
Finally, the procedure described above in detail
was adopted. The subject groups that were to be employed in
the experiment were matched by this time, and the experimen-
ter had purposefully matched a few extra subjects of the
younger deaf group and the older hearing group. These extra
subjects were not part of the actual experimental groups,
but they constituted representative specimens of these groups.
This way, the final pilot work could be conducted with sub-
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jects who were equivalent to the experimental population at
least in respeot to the most important characteristics, such
as age, IQ and socioeconomic background; The experimenter
had three main questions for this final pilot works one,
was a delay procedure necessary at all or would the better
subjects, the older hearing, perform too well without such
delay? Two, if a delay condition was indicated, how long
should this delay be? And three, how long would it take the
slowest group, the younger deaf, to go through the complete
experimental procedure with ten trials for each of the three
stimulus conditions? Furthermore, this pre-experimental test-
ing gave the experimenter and his assistant the necessary
practice with the experimental procedure*
Three hearing adolescents and five deaf children
were tested in small groups, employing various stimulus con-
ditions and a no-delay as well as a 5~seconds-delay procedure.
When the children were not required to count between presen-
tation of the last memory stimulus and the memory probe, the
older hearing evidenced 25/30 or 83$ accuracy of recognition
and the younger deaf scored 31/80 or Overall 9 recogni-
tion was better for colors than for the words. Employing the
5-seconds delay procedure, recognition was reduced to 10/30
or 33^ and 25/90 or 28$ for the older hearing and the younger
deaf respectively. It was decided, that some delay was desi-
rable, but that 5 seconds of delay rendered the task some-
what too difficult. The delay to be used in the experiment
119
proper was set at 3 seconds. (The recognition scores in the
actual experiment ranged from 2%% to 53%). It was also found
that the younger deaf required about k5 minutes to complete
the experiment. This time was believed to be highly undesi-
rable 5 since all subjects, especially the deaf, showed signs
of restlessness after about 30 minutes. Both the subjects as
well as the experimenter became restless after about seven
trials of the same stimulus condition. For these reasons,
the number of trials per stimulus condition were reduced from
ten to eight for the experiment.
i
APPENDIX D
TABLE Dl
EXPERIMENTAL RAW SCORES OF THE YOUNGER DEAF SUBJECTS.
Subject
~-
Colors Color-Words Abstract
1 4
— ...... n . ..
6 2
2 3 1 7
3 2 1 3
7 k
5 2 2 1
6 3 • 3
7 3 2
8 1 1 3
9 1 2 3
10 3 2 2
11 .5 2 2
12 •3 2 1
13 5 3
14 2 3 k
15 5 5 1
16 2 1 5
1? 2 1 3
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TABLE D2.
EXPERIMENTAL RAW SCORES OF THE YOUNGER HEARING SUBJECTS.
Subject Colors Color-Words Abstrac
T 8 oc oc
19 1 o "5J>
?0
21 j J
22 2 i 2
23 3
0 6 0
25 1 3 0
26 2 5 3
27 1 2
28 6 1
29 3 3 3
30 1 1 1
2 2
32 3
:
1 2
33 3 2 3
3^ 2 2 3
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TABLE D3.
EXPERIMENTAL RAW SCORES OF THE OLDER DEAF SUBJECTS.
35
36
37
38
39
4o
42
^3
44
45
46
4?
48
49
50
51
Subject Colors Color- Words Abstract 'Words
0 6 2
J
J I.4 2
3 4 2
I,
3 4
1 2
2 4 4
2 3
6 2
5 1 3
5 6 2
2 4 4
5 2 2
5 6 4
6 3 3
6 3 2
2 4 4
3 2 3
TABLE D4.
EXPERIMENTAL RAW SCORES OF THE OLDER HEARING SUBJECTS.
Subject Colors Color- Words Abstract Words
IWM iiUMMkHnMiAn^MMNMMMMMMM
I M— IWn i.i.jii i .-w- « .
52 5 4 5
53 7 4 3
5^ 5 3 5
55 3 4-1
56 5 5 4
57 2 3 3
58 4 4 ^
59 4 2 o
60 6 2 5
61 4 4 5
62 5 4 3
63 2 2 6
64 4 4 5
65 5 5 5
66 2 5 2
6? 4 6 4
68 6 3 3
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APPENDIX E
TABLE El.
SPECIFIC ERRORS MADE IN COLOR RECOGNITION BY THE FOUR
EXPERIMENTAL GROUPSa .
Error pairs Younger Younger Older Older
deaf hearing deaf hearing
blue-black 4 (8) 1 (2) 2 (3)
blue-brown 4 (10) 3 (4) 3 (3)
(2)
4 (6)
blue-red 3 (4) 7 (11) 2 6 (13)*
blue-green 4 (9) (7) 2 (3) 3. (1)
blue-White 1 (l) (9) 5 (5) 3 (3)
blue-gray 4 (10) 1 (1) mm
black-brown 11 ( 3^)^* 9 (19)* 3 (3) 4 (6)
black-red
1
(6) 6 (10) 4 (6) 6 (8)*
black-green (20) 2 (8) 3 (6) 2 (5)
black-gray 1 (1) 2 (2) 2 (5)
black-white 4 (12) 5 (9) 4 (5) 2 (6)
brown-red 7 (11) (8) 5 (10) 4 (8)
brown-green 4 (14) 4 (14) 3 (7)
brown-gray 2 (6) 6 (20) 5 (7) 4 (6)
brown-whi te 2 (3) 3 (3) 3 (3)
red-green 7 (11) 6 (U) 8 (13)*** 4 (14)
red-gray 8 (18) (8) 3 (9) 1 (1)
red-whi te 1 w 6 (10) 4 (10) 3 (6)
green-gray 3 (5) 6 (10) 4 (11) 3 (8)
green-white 2 (7) 10 (20)* 1 (1) 2 (8)
gray-white 7 (19) (17) 5 (15) 6 (18)*
avg. # pos.
96per errorb
M
2. 33 2.12 1. 2.06
4 4. 48 3.43 3
SD 2.81 2.49 1. 65 1 .7
a - the figures in parentheses give the total number of posi-
tions that the specific error was removed from the
correct answer.
b - the average number of positions that the specific group's
errors were removed from the correct answer.
*
-
.05 level of significance
**
-
.025 level of significance
***
- .01 level of significance
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TABLE E2.
SPECIFIC ERRORS MADE IN THE RECOGNITION OF COLOR- WORDS BY
THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS.
Error pairs Younger
deaf
Younger
hearing
Older
deaf
BLUE-BLACK 4r (10) 4r ( <\ D ^ o /
BLUE-BROWN ( (q) O (in
BLUE-RED <J 7f ( 1 ^ oJ
BLUE-GREEN 4r JL (1 ) QO
BLUE-GRAY JL ( 1)\ J 1 *|J-
BLUE-WHITE 4 (7) 3 (6) 2 (2)
BLA Civ- BRO UN 7 MR} * XU
BLACK-RED (6) 4 (8)
BLACK-GREEN 4r (3 0) 3 (5) X
BLACK-GRAY 6 (8) 3 (7) \ £ J
BLACK-WHITE 3 (10) 5 (11)
BROWN-RED 2 (3) 2 (6) i CD
BROWN-GREEN 5 (14) 1 (4) 4 (6)
BROWN-GRAY 4 (8) 3 (5) 3 (6)
BROWN- WHITE 5 (10) 4 (8) 5 (6)
RED-GREEN 7 (17)* 7 (14) 5 (15)
RED-GRAY 4 (7) 3 (6) 5 (8)
RED- WHITE 5 (10) 2 (6) 1 (2)
GREEN-GRAY 2 (9) 3 (7) 3 (7)
GREEN- WHITE 5 (9) 6 (14) 1 (1)
GRAY-WHITE 6 (12) 5 (15) 2 (5)
avg. # pos.
per error 2. 09 2.08 1. 93
M 4.43 4. 05 3- 52
SD 1. 37 2. 32 2. ^3
-
.05 level of significance
*
- .01 level of significance
•
.005 level of significance
Olde
hearing
1
4 (4)
1 (1)
1
4 (7)
7 ( 8 ) *
4 (8)
3 (11)
9 (21)****
1 (2)
3 (4)
3 (5)
2 (4)
5 (8)
2 (3)
2 (5)
6 (10)
1 (2)
1
(II2
5 (8)
3 (8)
4 (4)
1.82
3.43
2.05
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TABLE E3.
SPECIFIC ERRORS MADE IN THE RECOGNITION OF ABSTRACT WORDS
BY THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS.
Error pair Younger Younger Older Older
deaf hearing deaf hearing
TRUTH-FACT 4 (6) 1 (1) • 2 (4) 4 (5)
TRUTH-HOPE 5 (11) 6 (16) 9 (20)**
(7)
4 (11)
TRUTH-LAW 2 w 5 (13) 4 3 (4)
TRUTH- CO ST 3 (7) 6 (16) 4 (8) 3 (6)
TRUTH-MIND 3 (6) 7 (19) 7 (17) 6 (15)
TRUTH-TIME 6 (19) 3 Ms 6 (16) 1 (2)FACT-HOPE 3 (7) 7 (18) 1 (1) 5 (13)
FACT-LAW 5 (10) 8 (23) 7 (11) 2 (2)
FACT-COST 2 (7) 4 (8) 3 (4) 2 (6)
FACT-MIND 4 (15) 5 (7) 5 (15) 3 (9)
FACT-TIME (9) 5 (10) 5 (12) 2 (3)
HOPE-LAW 3 (6) 1 (1) 3 (8) 1 (6)
HOPE-COST 3 (5) 3 (5) 6 (15) 4 (4)
HOPE-MIND 8 (10)** 7 (12) 5 (11) 3 (11)
HOPE-TIME 3 (11) 3 (7) 3 (8) 2 (4)
LAW- COST 5 (8) 1 (1) 4 (5)
LAW-MIND 1 (1) 3 (7) 4 (8)
LAW-TIME 6 (18) 5 (7)
6"
(15) 4 (11)
COST-MIND 7 (16)* (9) 2 (5) 8 (13)***
COST-TIME 5 (14) 6 (14) 5 (10) 6 (9)
(1)MIND-TIME 2 (2) 9 (19)* 4 (4) 1
avg. # pos.
per error 2o28 2.21 2.18 2. 05
M 4.67 4.19 3.43
SD 1.74 2. 32 2. 22 1.76
—mum muw 1 urn 1 11 1 inm wmi iww.i w<fti whiihitiuti i f i - 1 ———- —
*
-
.05 level of significance.
**
-
.025 level of significance.
***
- .01 level of significance.
1
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APPENDIX F.
TABLE Fc
ACCURACY OF RECOGNITION OF INDICIDUAL COLORS (a.), INDIVID
UAL COLOR-WORDS (b«>) AND INDIVIDUAL ABSTRACT WORDS BY THE
FOUR EXPERIMENTAL GROUPSa .
a.
Stimulus Younger Younger Older Older
deaf hearing deaf hear^nj;
Red 65 4o ^5 55
Green 29 35 53 53
Gray 35 50 50 60
Brown 30 35 39 74
White ^3 22 52 43
Blue 35 18 41 35
Black 18 12 35 47
Stimulus Younger
b.
deaf
RED 35
GREEN 27
GRAY 24
BROWN 20
WHITE 25
BLUE 55
BLACK 12
Younger
Marine
30
46
29
30
30
40
47
Older
deaf
45
46
35
40
60
50
29
Older
hearin
65
42
41
60
45
41
Stimulus Younger Younger Older Older
deaf hearing deaf hearing.
TRUTH 35 40 20 50
FACT 53 24 41 71
HOPE 30 26 39 43
COST 29 35 53 12
LAW 47 29 35 65
MIND 39 13 26 30
TIME 25 30 35 55
a - in percent
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APPENDIX G
TABLE G.
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR ALL INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT
VARIABLES EMPLOYED IN THE EXPERIMENT.
vaxiaDies lounger Younger Older Older
.,...„ I..,,,,.
deal hearing deaf hearing
Age-IQ -.13 -.38 -.49* -.11
Age-SEa -.29 .16 .03 • 03
Age»LAt) .11 .07
Ji
-•04
-.17 -.00 -.28
IQ-LA
.29 .45
SE-LA _ .02 .06 n
Age-Cc • 30 .19 .04 -.21
Age-CWd • 51* .40 -.45 -.05
Age-AWe -.11 -.19 .47 .10
IQ-C ;02 il5 .20 .48
IQ-CW .15 .04 •39 -.03
10-AW -;24 .34 -.11 •35
SE-C •15 .12 .14 -.62**
SE-CW -.17 .27 -.27 .16
SE-AW •37 -.07 -.23 -.23
LA-C -.13 -.06
LA-CW .45 -.12
LA-AW •13 • 2.1
a - Socioeconomic background,
b - Language achievement.
c - Recognition performance with color stimuli.
d - Recognition performance with color-word stimuli.
e - Recognition performance with abstract viord stimuli.
*
-
.05 significance level
**
- .02 significance level
1
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Rcscnrch Department
Heredity of Deafness
Ruth B. Hudgins, Ed.M.
Psychology
Sous L. Kates, Ph.D.
Audiology
Arthur Boothroyd, Ph.D.
Unxy ©cljonl for U]j? Scaf
Sfnrtljtuujjlun, £HasBacljitsetlfi
01060
Telephone: 584-3450
Principal
George T. F^att
Assistant to the Principal
Bill G. Blevins
Business Manager and Treasurer
Edwin B. Hubbard, Jk.
June 2, 1971
Dear
I would like to express my gratitude for your generous help
in accomplishing the present stage of ray research efforts*
A large number of persons — guidance counselors, teachers,
administrators and researchers, as veil as the many eager and
charming youngsters — participated in this project.
Let us hope that all our efforts will be rewarded by some
meaningful findings vhich vill point the way to a significant
research contribution.
Sincerely,
Toni Farrcnkopf
Research Associate


